Where Law Meets Reality

Considering the core debates about how to develop a transitional justice agenda that best responds to the African context, this book addresses the tension between justice, peace and reconciliation.

THE SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER and a Times, Spectator and Observer Book of the Year 2021 ‘In the first decade of this century, it was unthinkable that a gender-critical book could even be published by a prominent publishing house, let alone become a bestseller.’ Louise Perry, New Statesman ‘Thank goodness for Helen Joyce.’ Christina Patterson, Sunday Times ‘Reasonable, methodical, sane, and utterly unintimidated by extremist orthodoxy, Trans is a riveting read.’ Lionel Shriver ‘A tour de force.’ Evening Standard Biological sex is no longer accepted as a basic fact of life. It is forbidden to admit that female people sometimes need protection and privacy from male ones. In an analysis that is at once expert, sympathetic and urgent, Helen Joyce offers an antidote to the chaos and cancelling.

This eagerly awaited new edition has been significantly revised after extensive user feedback to meet current teaching requirements. The first major textbook to be published since the rejuvenation of the Lisbon Treaty, it retains the best elements of the first edition – the engaging, easily understandable writing style, extracts from a variety of sources showing the creation, interpretation and application of the law and comprehensive coverage. In addition it has separate chapters on EU law in national courts, governance and external relations reflecting the new directions in which the field is moving. The examination of the free movement of goods and competition law has been restructured. Chapter introductions clearly set out what will be covered in each section allowing students to approach complex material with confidence and detailed further reading sections encourage further study. Put simply, it is required reading for all serious students of EU law.

Law, Human Agency and Autonomic Computing interrogates the legal implications of the notion and experience of human agency implied by the emerging paradigm of autonomic computing, and the socio-technical infrastructures it supports. The development of autonomic computing and ambient intelligence – self-governing systems – challenge traditional philosophical conceptions of human self-constitution and agency, with significant consequences for the theory and practice of constitutional self-government. Ideas of identity, subjectivity, agency, personhood, intentionality, and embodiment are all central to the functioning of modern legal systems. But once artificial entities become more autonomic, and less dependent on deliberate human intervention, criteria like agency, intentionality and self-determination, become too fragile to serve as defining criteria for human subjectivity, personality or identity, and for characterizing the processes through which individual citizens become moral and legal subjects. Are autonomic – yet artificial – systems shrinking the distance between (acting) subjects and (acted upon) objects? How ‘distinctively human’ will agency be in a world of autonomic computing? Or, alternatively, does autonomic computing merely disclose that we were never, in this sense, ‘human’ anyway? A dialogue between philosophers of technology and philosophers of law, this book addresses these questions, as it takes up the unprecedented opportunity that autonomic computing and ambient intelligence offer for a reassessment of the most basic concepts of law.

Study commenting on the relationship between the legal system and political system as refleted in legislation in the USSR - discusses the ideology of Soviet law; examines issues relating to democracy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, the right to work, religious freedom, cultural rights, etc.; considers the impact of social stratification on the legal status of citizens and on judicial procedures; includes judicial decisions. References.

In the countries of the global North, workplace democracy may be thought of as a thing of the past. Increasingly, working relations are regulated primarily by contract; workforces are fissured and fragmented. What are the consequences of this? How should we respond? Ruth Dukes and Wolfgang Streeck argue that the time is ripe to restate the principles of industrial democracy and citizenship for the post-industrial era. Considering developments within political economy, employment relations and labour law since the postwar decades, they trace the rise of globalization and the ‘dualization’ of labour markets – the emergence of a core and periphery of workers – and the progressive insulation of working relations from democratic governance. What these developments amount to, they argue, is an urgent need for political intervention to tame the new world of ‘gigging’ and other forms of highly precarious work. This, according to the authors, will require far-reaching institution-building designed to fill legal concepts such as ‘employment’ with political substance. This eloquent call for a reimagining and renewal of the institutional and material conditions of freedom of association and the reinvention of industrial democracy will be crucial reading for anyone interested in work in the twenty-first century.

Allan Beever lays the foundation for a timely philosophical and empirical study of the nature of law with a detailed examination of the structure of evolving law through declaratory speech acts. This engaging book demonstrates both how law itself is achieved and also its ability to generate rights, duties, obligations, permissions and powers.

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. To speak about fact in law already brings in the operation we call interpretation. EquaHy, to speak about interpretation is to deal with the method of identifying reality and therefore, in large part, to enter the area of the question of fact. By way of example, Bemard Jackson's text, which we have placed in section 11 of the first part of this volume, could no doubt just as weH have found a horne in section I. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other. All philosophies of law recognize themselves in the analysis they propose for this interpretation, and we too shall seek in this volume to fumish a few elements of use for this analysis. We wish however to make it clear that our endeavour is addressed not only to legal philosophers: the nature of the interpretive act in legal science is a matter of interest to the legal practitioner too. He will find in these pages, we believe, elements that will serve hirn in rcflcction on his daily work.