Why Noncompliance

Why Noncompliance traces the history of noncompliance within the European Union (EU), focusing on which states continuously do or do not follow EU Law, why, and how that affects the governance in the EU and beyond. In exploring the EU's long and varied history of noncompliance, Tanja A. Börzel takes a close look at the diverse groups of noncompliant states throughout the EU's existence. Why do states that are vocally critical of the EU have a better record of compliance than those that support the EU? Why has noncompliance been declining since the 1990s, even though the EU was adding member-states and numerous laws? Börzel debunks conventional wisdoms in EU compliance research, showing that noncompliance in the EU is not caused by the new Central and Eastern European member states, nor by the Eurosceptic member states. So why do these states take the brunt of Europe's misplaced ire? Why Noncompliance introduces politicization as an explanatory factor that has been long overlooked in the literature and scholarship surrounding the European Union. Börzel argues that political controversy combined with voting power and administrative capacity, explains why noncompliance with EU law has been declining since the completion of the Single Market, cannot be blamed on the EU's Central and Easter European member states, and is concentrated in areas where EU seeks to protect citizen rights. Thanks to generous funding from Freie Universitat Berlin, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

The Political Economy of Noncompliance explains why states fail to comply with international law. Over the last sixty years, states have signed treaties, established international courts and other supranational institutions to achieve the benefits of international cooperation. Nowhere has this been more successful than in the European Union. European integration has produced one of the most intensely legalized regimes in the world. Yet, even in the European Union, noncompliance of states often occurs. This book explores the sources of and reasons for noncompliance, and assesses why noncompliance varies across the Member States and over time by looking at the domestic politics of complying with international law. The author uses examples from the history of economic integration in the EU in three countries and two different policy areas to demonstrate these mechanisms at work. The Political Economy of Noncompliance will be of interest to students and scholars of European Politics, international relations and political economy.

Why Noncompliance traces the history of noncompliance within the European Union (EU), focusing on which states continuously do or do not follow EU Law, why, and how that affects the governance in the EU and beyond. In exploring the EU's long and varied history of noncompliance, Tanja A. Börzel takes a close look at the diverse groups of noncompliant states throughout the EU's existence. Why do states that are vocally critical of the EU have a better record of compliance than those that support the EU? Why has noncompliance been declining since the 1990s, even though the EU was adding member-states and numerous laws? Börzel debunks conventional wisdoms in EU compliance research, showing that noncompliance in the EU is not caused by the new Central and Eastern European member states, nor by the Eurosceptic member states. So why do these states take the brunt of Europe's misplaced ire? Why Noncompliance introduces politicization as an explanatory factor that has been long overlooked in the literature and scholarship surrounding the European Union. Börzel argues that political controversy combined with voting power and administrative capacity, explains why noncompliance with EU law has been declining since the completion of the Single Market, cannot be blamed on the EU's Central and Easter European member states, and is concentrated in areas where EU seeks to protect citizen rights. Thanks to generous funding from Freie Universitat Berlin, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

A first-hand account of the oversight of the big banks in the wake of the financial crisis, from the Federal Reserve examiner who refused to be silenced In 2011, Carmen Segarra took a job as at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York supervising for Goldman Sachs. It was an opportunity, she believed, to monitor the big bank's behavior in order to avoid another financial crisis. Segarra was shocked to discover, however, the full extent of the relationship between Goldman and the Fed. She began making secret recordings that later became the basis of a This American Life episode that exposed the Fed's ineffectiveness in holding banks accountable. In Noncompliant, Segarra chronicles her experience blowing open the doors on the relationship between the big banks and the government bodies set up to regulate them. As we mark the tenth anniversary of the 2008 financial crisis, Noncompliant shows us how little has changed, and offers an urgent call for real reforms.

This systematic approach to classroom management provides evidence-based strategies for assessing student insubordination and offers guidelines for developing individual intervention plans that improve cooperation.

This paper employs unique tax administrative data and operational audit information from a sample of approximately 7,500 self-employed U.S. taxpayers to investigate the effects of operational tax audits on future reporting behavior. Our estimates indicate that audits can have substantial deterrent or counter-deterrent effects. Among those taxpayers who receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be 64% higher in the first year after the audit than it would have been in the absence of the audit. In contrast, among those taxpayers who do not receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be approximately 15% lower the year after the audit than it would have been had the audit not taken place. Our results suggest that improved targeting of audits towards noncompliant taxpayers would not only yield more direct audit revenue, it would also pay dividends in terms of future tax collections.

An in-depth examination of the regulatory, entrepreneurial, and organizational factors contributing to the expansion and transformation of China’s supplemental education industry. Like many parents in the United States, parents in China, increasingly concerned with their children’s academic performance, are turning to for-profit tutoring businesses to help their children get ahead in school. China’s supplemental education industry is now the world’s largest and most vibrant for-profit education market, and we can see its influence on the US higher education system: more than 70% of Chinese students studying in American universities have taken test preparation classes for overseas standardized tests. The Fruits of Opportunism offers a much-needed thorough investigation into this industry. This book examines how opportunistic organizations thrived in an ambiguous policy environment and how they catalyzed organizational and institutional changes in this industry. A former insider in China’s Education Industry, sociologist Le Lin shows how and why this industry evolved to become a for-profit one dominated by private, formal, nationally operating, and globally financed corporations, despite restrictions the Chinese state placed on the industry. Looking closely at the opportunistic organizations that were founded by marginal entrepreneurs and quickly came to dominate the market, Lin finds that as their non-compliant practices spread across the industry, these opportunistic organizations pushed privatization and marketization from below. The case of China’s Education Industry laid out in The Fruits of Opportunism illustrates that while opportunism leaves destruction in its wake, it can also drive the formation and evolution of a market.