Why Not Default

How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries—and the dangers this poses to democracy The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece’s short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone--including the dramatic capitulation of Greece's short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance.

The untold story of how FDR did the unthinkable to save the American economy.

An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of default, vulnerability to runs, the incentive to “dilute” existing creditors, and sovereign debt’s distortion of investment and growth. The book uses the tractable framework to isolate how each additional friction affects the equilibrium outcome, and illustrates its counterpart using state-of-the-art computational modeling. The novel approach presented here contrasts the outcome of a constrained efficient allocation—one chosen to maximize the joint surplus of creditors and government—with the competitive equilibrium outcome. This allows for a clear analysis of the extent to which equilibrium prices efficiently guide the government’s debt and default decisions, and of what drives divergences with the efficient outcome. Providing an integrated approach to sovereign debt and default, this incisive and authoritative book is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students interested in this important topic.

How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries—and the dangers this poses to democracy The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece’s short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

Consumer credit borrowing – using credit cards, store cards and personal loans – is an important and routine part of many of our lives. But what happens when these everyday forms of borrowing go ‘bad’, when people start to default on their loans and when they cannot, or will not, repay? It is this poorly understood, controversial, but central part of both the consumer credit industry and the lived experiences of an increasing number of people that this book explores. Drawing on research from the interior of the debt collections industry, as well as debtors' own accounts and historical research into technologies of lending and collection, it examines precisely how this ever more sophisticated, globally connected market functions. It focuses on the highly intimate techniques used to try and recoup defaulting debts from borrowers, as well as on the collection industry’s relationship with lenders. Joe Deville follows a journey of default, from debtors’ borrowing practices, to the intrusion of collections technologies into their homes and everyday lives, to the collections organisation, to attempts by debtors to seek outside help. In the process he shows how to understand this particular market, we need to understand the central role played within it by emotion and affect. By opening up for scrutiny an area of the economy which is often hidden from view, this book makes a major contribution both to understanding the relationship between emotion and calculation in markets and the role of consumer credit in our societies and economies. This book will be of interest to students, teachers and researchers in a range of fields, including sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, economics and social psychology.

What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default.

Review: "In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin's government defaulted on its domestic debt and Russia experienced a financial meltdown that brought it to the brink of disaster. In No Precedent, No plan, Martin Gilman offers an insider's view of Russia's financial crisis. As the International Monetary Fund's senior person in Moscow, Gilman was in the eye of the storm. Russia's policy response to the economic collapse stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet Union was chaotic. Fiscal deficits loomed in anticipation of future budget revenue that never seemed to materialize--despite repeated promises to the IMF. The rapid buildup of sovereign debt would have challenged even a competent government. In the new Russia, with its barely functioning government and no consensus on the path toward democratic and economic transformation, domestic politics trumped economic common sense." "Gilman argues that the debt default, although avoidable, actually spurred Russia to integrate its economy with the rest of the world. In analyzing the ordeal of the 1998 crisis, Gilman suggests that the IMF helped Russia avoid an even greater catastrophe. He details the IMF's involvement and underscores the unique challenge that Russia presented to the IMF. There really was no precedent, even if economist Joseph Stiglitz and others argued otherwise. In recounting Russia's emergence from the IMF's tutelage, Gilman explains how the shell-shocked Russian public turned to Vladimir Putin in search of stability after the trauma of 1998. And although Russia's own prospects are favorable, Gilman expresses concern that the 1998 Russian default could serve as an unfortunate precedent for sovereign defaults in the future with the IMF once again playing a similar role." "No Precedent, No Plan offers a definitive account--the first from an insider's perspective--of Russia's painful transition to a market economy."--BOOK JACKET