Will Precedent

Since its first publication in 1970, HUTLEY'S AUSTRALIAN WILLS PRECEDENTS has become the essential reference work on the art of will drafting in Australia. The 7th edition is much more than an 'update' of the previous edition. The whole book has been thoroughly examined and reconsidered. The text, forms and precedents have been revised and in many places rewritten and extended. New cases and statutes have been taken into account and contentious issues critically examined. The precedent for a testamentary discretionary family trust will fill a need. These trusts are very difficult to draft. The trust offered here is a flexible, middle-of-the-road, general vehicle, designed to be adaptable to the needs of clients and practitioners. It allows for income splitting and offers some asset protection. The precedent is considered and explained in the text and is accompanied by a full and detailed explanatory document to be given to clients. The new, detailed, Table of Contents is intended to be a search engine, to complement the conventional index. It is a comprehensive list of all chapter and paragraph headings, occupying many pages; it therefore offers ready access to the matters which a will drafter has to consider. A Compact Disc containing all the precedents and forms in Microsoft Word 2002 format is included.

Parker's Will Precedents provides private client solicitors and professional will draftsmen with a thorough understanding and working knowledge of the will drafting process and, as a result, the ability to draft better wills. It provides:- A comprehensive collection of precedents aimed at anyone who needs to draft wills - A variety of precedents for individual clauses as well as a set of complete wills catering for different scenarios - An emphasis on clarity, practicality and simplicity, so you can quickly draft legally sound wills for a variety of circumstances - Notes and guidance on drafting and additional materials, including letters, support materials and extracts from relevant legislation The ninth edition includes coverage of the Residential Nil Rate Band (changing from April 2017) as well as new chapter on flexible life interest trusts and EC Succession Regulation.This book comes with an electronic download of the precedents, for you to adapt and use in your contracts. On purchase, you will be provided with a code and a web link from which the precedents can be downloaded in a generic format such as *.doc which will be compatible with all operating systems.

Philosophical Foundations of Precedent offers a broad, deep, and diverse range of philosophical investigations of the role of precedent in law, adjudication, and morality. The forty chapters present the work of a large and inclusive group of authors which comprises of well-established leaders in the discipline and new voices in legal philosophy. The magnitude of the resulting project is extraordinary, presenting a diverse array of innovative and creative philosophical investigations of the practice of adhering to past decisions, in law and allied fields of practical reasoning. And by the same token, the contributions elucidate the reasons that courts and other decision-makers may have for departing from what has been done before. The phenomena under investigation include the law and practice of common law and civil jurisdictions around the world. In addition to its fundamental relevance to common law jurisdictions, this work will be of broad and significant interest to theoretically minded audiences in continental Europe, Latin America, and Asia because it involves an extensive study of practices of precedent in civil law systems as well as common law systems.

Analytical jurisprudence has been mostly silent on the role of precedent in legal adjudication. What is the content of a judge's precedent ideology,or the rule of precedent-recognition, by means of which the ratio of a case is to be distinguished from mere dicta? In this study, the author identifies six types of judicial precedent-ideology, among them judicial legislation, systemic construction of the underlying reasons of law in the Dworkinian sense, and a radical re-evaluation of the merits of a prior case in later adjudication, as envisioned by the American Realists. These competing models are tested against judicial experiences in the UK, US, France, Italy, Germany and Finland. By this means Lon Fuller's famous 'internal morality of law' is shown to function rather poorly in the context of precedents, and the author therefore suggests a redefinition of the rule which makes it work for precedent. This, in turn leads the author to confront fundamental questions about the normative nature of law. Is Kelsen's grundnorm or Hart's ultimate rule of recognition a valid rule, in the image of legal rules proper, or is it merely a social fact, observable only in the practices and behaviour of judges and other officials? The author claims that Hart is caught between Kelsen and J.L. Borges, the late Argentinian fabulist, in so far as the ontology and epistemology of the rule of recognition are concerned. This leads the author to the conclusion that the two predicaments affecting analytical positivism, namely the threat of endless self-referentiality, or infinite regress, can only be accounted for by means of recourse to the philosophy of deconstruction as posited by Jacques Derrida.

The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court offers an insightful and provocative analysis of the Supreme Court's most important task--shaping the law. Thomas Hansford and James Spriggs analyze a key aspect of legal change: the Court's interpretation or treatment of the precedents it has set in the past. Court decisions do not just resolve immediate disputes; they also set broader precedent. The meaning and scope of a precedent, however, can change significantly as the Court revisits it in future cases. The authors contend that these interpretations are driven by an interaction between policy goals and variations in the legal authoritativeness of precedent. From this premise, they build an explanation of the legal interpretation of precedent that yields novel predictions about the nature and timing of legal change. Hansford and Spriggs test their hypotheses by examining how the Court has interpreted the precedents it set between 1946 and 1999. This analysis provides compelling support for their argument, and demonstrates that the justices' ideological goals and the role of precedent are inextricably linked. The two prevailing, yet contradictory, views of precedent--that it acts either solely as a constraint, or as a "cloak" that never actually influences the Court--are incorrect. This book shows that while precedent can operate as a constraint on the justices' decisions, it also represents an opportunity to foster preferred societal outcomes.