Wto Dispute Settlement Cases Involving The Agreement On Agriculture 1995 2019

A landmark achievement of the Uruguay Round, and notably, the Agreement on Agriculture, was the full inclusion of agriculture in multilateral rules and disciplines. Since the birth of World Trade Organization (WTO), a significant number of member countries have used the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) for resolving the disputes in agriculture. The DSM has played an important role not only for those parties involved in the disputes, but also by helping member countries to better understand the WTO rules, and therefore help guide them in developing domestic policies and trade policies that are consistent with WTO requirements. This paper examines trade disputes involving the Agreement on Agriculture since the WTO was formed in 1995 through December 2019. It analyzes who brought the disputes and against whom disputes were brought, and provides details on the natures of the disputes, the duration of disputes, and, the outcome of those disputes.

These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2019: Volume VI contains the panel report on 'China - Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers' (WT/DS511).

As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, the United States has committed to abide by WTO rules and disciplines, including those that govern domestic farm policy as spelled out in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Since establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995, the United States has complied with its WTO spending limits on marketdistorting types of farm program outlays (referred to as amber box spending). However, the addition of large, new trade assistance payments to producers in 2018 and 2019, on top of existing farm program support, has raised concerns by some U.S. trading partners, as well as market watchers and policymakers, that U.S. domestic farm subsidy outlays might exceed the annual spending limit of $19.1 billion agreed to as part of U.S. commitments to WTO member countries. CRS analysis indicates that the United States probably did not violate its WTO spending limit in 2018 but could potentially exceed it in 2019. A farm support program can violate WTO commitments in two principal ways: first, by exceeding spending limits on certain market-distorting programs, and second, by generating distortions that spill over into the international marketplace and cause significant adverse effects. Program outlays are cumulative, and compliance with WTO commitments is based on annual aggregate spending levels. Under the WTO's AoA, total U.S. amber box outlays (that is, those outlays deemed market distorting) are limited to $19.1 billion annually, subject to de minimis exemptions. De minimis exemptions are spending that is sufficiently small (less than 5% of the value of production)-relative to either the value of a specific product or total production-to be deemed benign. Since 1995, the United States has apparently stayed within its amber box limits. However, U.S. compliance has hinged on judicious use of the de minimis exemptions in a number of years to exclude certain amber box spending from counting against the amber box limit. These exemptions have never been challenged by another WTO member. According to CRS analysis, projected U.S. amber box spending for 2018 (inclusive of $8.7 billion in product-specific outlays under the 2018 trade assistance package) could exceed $14 billion. This would be the largest U.S. amber box notification since 2001. However, despite its magnitude, it still would fit within the U.S. spending limit of $19.1 billion. A more ambiguous result is projected for 2019. The expansion of direct payments under a second trade assistance package to $14.5 billion in 2019 and their shift to a non-product-specific WTO classification-when combined with currently projected spending under other non-product-specific programs such as the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) programs-could push U.S. amber box outlays above $24 billion. This would be in excess of the U.S. amber box spending limit of $19.1 billion. However, this projection hinges on several as-yet-unknown factors, including market prices, output values, and program outlays under traditional countercyclical ARC and PLC programs. If the final price and revenue values are higher than currently projected, then program payments under ARC and PLC could be smaller than those used in this analysis. This could decrease both aggregate non-product-specific outlays and the possibility of exceeding the amber box spending limit. If cumulative payments in any year were to exceed the agreed-upon spending limit, then the United States would be in violation of its commitments and could be vulnerable to a challenge under the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, to the extent that such program outlays might induce surplus production and depress market prices, they could also result in potential challenges under the WTO.

The 3rd Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Seattle was not able to launch a new and comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations, but it is expected that in the coming years the WTO will be the forum of these negotiations, commonly referred to as the Millenium Round. Developing countries are currently greatly involved in the WTO process and seek active participation in this round. In relation to least developed countries in Africa, and with Ethiopia as country for a case study, the present paper argues that the Agreement on Agriculture, part of the Uruguay Round, has put a system of basic mechanisms into place but not led to significant agricultural trade liberalization. At the same time, a new host of issues have emerged that relate directly or indirectly to food and agriculture. The report highlights the various interactions between these subjects from the perspective of Ethiopia.

This incisive book provides a comprehensive overview of the WTO dispute settlement practice from 1995 up until the present day, illustrating the need for it to be resurrected from its current state of crisis. The WTO Dispute Settlement System will prove an essential read for students and scholars of WTO law, as well as lawyers, political scientists and policy-oriented economists interested in the WTO dispute settlement system.

Non-tariff measures are generally defined as policy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both. Since this definition is broad, a detailed classification is of critical importance so as to better identify and distinguish among the various forms of non-tariff measures. The classification of non-tariff measures presented here is a taxonomy of all those measures considered relevant in international trade today. It builds on an old UNCTAD classification known as the Coding System of Trade Control Measures and was developed by several international organizations forming what is called the MAST group (Multi-Agency Support Team) set up to support the Group of Eminent Persons on Non-tariff Barriers established by the Secretary General of UNCTAD in 2006. The MAST team discussed and proposed this classification, and is composed of: FAO, IMF, ITC, OECD, UNCTAD, UNIDO, World Bank and WTO. The classification is seen as evolving and should adapt to the reality of international trade and data collection needs.