Accidents And Disasters

This analysis of catastrophes provides a pathway for those who want to foster truthtelling in their organization and head off disasters in the making. We tend to think of disasters as uncontrollable acts of nature or inevitable accidents. But are such incidents unavoidable or ever truly accidental? The authors of this remarkable book say we actually do have the power to prevent tragedies such as the flooding from Hurricane Katrina, the death toll from dangerous medicines like Vioxx, and the explosion of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Marc Gerstein and Michael Ellsberg insist that disasters need not be inevitable if we learn from history, prepare carefully for the worst case, and speak out when we see danger looming. This revelation makes their compelling study extremely valuable for readers in business, government, medicine, academia—indeed all walks of life. Flirting with Disaster will do for catastrophe what Blink did for intuition, and The Black Swan did for probability: provide a popular audience with an engaging, in-depth view of a complex and important topic. Gerstein and Ellsberg examine the culture of institutions: why even people of good will and inside knowledge underestimate risk; feel psychologically incapable of averting tragedy and unable to pick up the pieces afterward; and don’t come forward forcefully enough to head off catastrophe. They also celebrate those who go beyond the call of duty to save others, including Dr. David Graham of the FDA who courageously stood up to reveal Vioxx’s deadly effects. One such whistleblower contributes both a foreword and an afterword: Daniel Ellsberg, renowned for releasing the Pentagon Papers.

Here, Dave Shayler examines the hurdles faced by space crews as they prepare and embark on space missions. Divided into six parts, the text opens with the fateful, tragic mission of the Challenger crew in 1986. This is followed by a review of the risks that accompany every space trip and the unique environment in which the space explorer lives and works. The next four sections cover the four parts of any space flight (training, launch, in-flight and recovery) and present major historical incidents in each case. The final section looks at the next forty years beyond the Earth's atmosphere, beginning with the International Space Station and moving on to the difficulties inherent in a manned exploration of Mars.

Presents a chronologically-arranged reference to catastrophic events in American history, including natural disasters, economic depressions, riots, murders, and terrorist attacks.

A journalist recounts the surprising history of accidents and reveals how they’ve come to define all that’s wrong with America. We hear it all the time: “Sorry, it was just an accident.” And we’ve been deeply conditioned to just accept that explanation and move on. But as Jessie Singer argues convincingly: There are no such things as accidents. The vast majority of mishaps are not random but predictable and preventable. Singer uncovers just how the term “accident” itself protects those in power and leaves the most vulnerable in harm’s way, preventing investigations, pushing off debts, blaming the victims, diluting anger, and even sparking empathy for the perpetrators. As the rate of accidental death skyrockets in America, the poor and people of color end up bearing the brunt of the violence and blame, while the powerful use the excuse of the “accident” to avoid consequences for their actions. Born of the death of her best friend, and the killer who insisted it was an accident, this book is a moving investigation of the sort of tragedies that are all too common, and all too commonly ignored. In this revelatory book, Singer tracks accidental death in America from turn of the century factories and coal mines to today’s urban highways, rural hospitals, and Superfund sites. Drawing connections between traffic accidents, accidental opioid overdoses, and accidental oil spills, Singer proves that what we call accidents are hardly random. Rather, who lives and dies by an accident in America is defined by money and power. She also presents a variety of actions we can take as individuals and as a society to stem the tide of “accidents”—saving lives and holding the guilty to account.

This book deals with the contemporary subject of perception of risk and its influence on accidents and disasters. The contents examine the conventional viewpoints on human errors, incubation of errors, complexity and organisational deviance as a cause for accidents. Work of Mary Douglas with regard to risk, Charles Perrow's work on the normal accident theory and Diane Vaughan's theory on normalisation of deviance are examined from a fresh perspective in this book. It also discusses prominent accidents in aviation, space, nuclear energy, automotive and healthcare, using the pandemic and Boeing 737 Max as a backdrop to study accidents and disasters. It further explores the background and similarities to these events and addresses the core issues such as the state of regulation, the worldview of the sociologists, and proposes that mental models of complex systems, avarice and risk for gain as other possibilities for accidents. Using the concept of nudge in behavioural economics and the Elinor Ostrom's viewpoint on regulating for common good, it suggests a way forward through the High Reliability Organisation Theory (HRO) leading to enhanced risk perception. The book will be of interest to those who would like to understand the need to incorporate risk perception into regulation, engineers and scientists, professionals and policy makers working in the areas of disaster and risk management, technology areas like aviation, nuclear plants, space and healthcare, students of the sociology of risk and of course the general reader.

This series of essays on safety and loss prevention is aimed at helping the process industries avoid accidents and improve its public image. The central message is the apparent inability of organizations to learn, and retain in the long term, the lessons drawn from accidents. Thus incidents of a similar type recur within the same company at intervals of a decade or so, as personnel involved move on to other jobs.

Normal Accidents analyzes the social side of technological risk. Charles Perrow argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety--building in more warnings and safeguards--fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable. He asserts that typical precautions, by adding to complexity, may help create new categories of accidents. (At Chernobyl, tests of a new safety system helped produce the meltdown and subsequent fire.) By recognizing two dimensions of risk--complex versus linear interactions, and tight versus loose coupling--this book provides a powerful framework for analyzing risks and the organizations that insist we run them. The first edition fulfilled one reviewer's prediction that it "may mark the beginning of accident research." In the new afterword to this edition Perrow reviews the extensive work on the major accidents of the last fifteen years, including Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger disaster. The new postscript probes what the author considers to be the "quintessential 'Normal Accident'" of our time: the Y2K computer problem.