Air War On Terror

An unstable political environment and unsettled security led to the prevalency of insurgency and long-lasting civil wars in every country with weakened central powers. Sectarianism from one or both parties in conflict can cause radicalization and help to sow the seeds of terrorist groups. ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), ISIS, IS or Daesh is the best example of a modern-era Jihadist terrorist group which has taken advantage of political and security vacuums in Iraq, Syria and Libya to achieve the most significant victories an Islamic terrorist group has ever gained since the early 20th century. While the Iraqi Air Force and Army Aviation Corps started to heavily use their limited resources to slow down ISIL progress in Iraq and prevent the occupation of Baghdad, the US conducted 'Operation Inherent Resolve' in Iraq (beginning 15 June 2014) and then in Syria (from 22 September 2014) in order to limit ISIL/ Daesh power. USAF, USMC or USN Air Forces - as well as the naval aviation forces of 17 more US allies - operated dozens of their combat aircraft from nine air bases in seven Middle Eastern and European countries, as well as their aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, in order to perform thousands of combat sorties against ISIL during 'Operation Inherent Resolve' or their own operations such as 'Chammal', 'Impact', 'Okra' and 'Shader' during the first phase of the air campaign between 31 August 2014 and 30 September 2015. By the time Russia s role in the Syrian war theater began, the second phase of the air war on ISIL had started - but this time, to totally eliminate its existence in Syria and Iraq; and it was not just the Russian Air Force... the Allied air forces, led by USAF, significantly broadened their presence in the air war, using new tactics targeting all financial axes of the terror group including its oil industry. Based upon declassified documents and daily reports released by all participants of the air campaign, this book provides details of all combat operations conducted by Armee de l'air, Aeronautica Militare, the French Aeronavale, IQAA, IQAF, IRIAA, IRIAF, LNAF (Libyan National Air Force), LDAF (Libyan Dawn Air Force), Luftwaffe, RAF, RAAF, RCAF, RDAF, RJAF, RNAF, RuAF, USN, USAF, USMC and other air forces involved in air operations against ISIL in Iraq, Syria and Libya since the first day of ISIL's widespread offensive in Iraq in June 2014 until 1 June 2016. The author's detailed text is fully supported by an extensive selection of pictures of all participating aircraft."

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 plunged the United States into a determined counteroffensive against Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network. This report details the initial U.S. military response to those attacks, namely, the destruction of al Qaeda's terrorist infrastructure and the removal of the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The author emphasizes several distinctive achievements in this war, including the use of precision air-delivered weapons that were effective irrespective of weather, the first combat use of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles armed with Hellfire missiles, and the integrated employment of high-altitude drones and other air- and space-based sensors that gave CENTCOM unprecedented round-the-clock awareness of enemy activity.

Describes America's air sovereignty mission in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The use of airpower in wartime calls to mind the massive bombings of World War II, but airplanes have long been instrumental in small wars as well. Ever since its use by the French to put down rebellious Moroccan tribes in 1913, airpower has been employed to fight in limited but often lengthy small conflicts around the globe. This is the first comprehensive history of airpower in small wars-conflicts pitting states against non-state groups such as insurgents, bandits, factions, and terrorists-tracing it from the early years of the twentieth century to the present day. It examines dozens of conflicts with strikingly different scenarios: the Greek Civil War, the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign, French and British colonial wars, the war in South Vietnam before the American escalation, counterinsurgency in southern Africa, Latin American counterguerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns in the Middle East over the last four decades. For each war, the authors describe the strategies employed on both sides of the conflict, the air forces engaged, and the specific airpower tactics employed. They discuss the ground campaigns and provide the political background necessary to understand the air campaigns, and in each case they judge the utility of airpower in its broadest sense. In their historic sweep, they show how forms of airpower evolved from planes to police helicopters, aircraft of the civilian air reserve, and today's unmanned aircraft. They also disclose how small wars after World War II required new strategies, operational solutions, and tactics. By taking this broad view of small-war airpower, the authors are able to make assessments about the most effective and least effective means of employing airpower. They offer specific conclusions ranging from the importance of comprehensive strategy to the need for the United States and its allies to expand small-wars training programs. Airpower in Small Wars will be invaluable for educating military professionals and policy makers in the subject as well as for providing a useful framework for developing more effective doctrine for employing airpower in the conflicts we are most likely to see in the twenty-first century.

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

Airpower played a pivotal role in the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State from 2014 to 2019 and contributed to the success of Operation Inherent Resolve, but airpower alone would not have been likely to defeat the militant organization.