Assessing The Risk Of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between India And Pakistan

Conventional warfare between India and Pakistan could inadvertently escalate to nuclear warfare. Asymmetries in military doctrine and capability undermine deterrence stability and could lead to the use of nuclear weapons if the two nations become engaged in a large-scale conventional conflict. Following the 1998 nuclear weapons test, the 1999 Kargil Conflict played out tinder the nuclear umbrella, but remained very limited. However, there is a growing gap in conventional military capabilities, and growing pressure in India to retaliate against Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism and insurgency. India has invested heavily in force modernization, potentially changing the scope of conventional military operations and leading to Pakistan's inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. This thesis examines the possibility of inadvertent nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan. It analyzes the deterrence system that is evolving in South Asia, and describes the conditions tinder which the system could fail. Large-scale conventional war could threaten the survival of strategic forces, or threaten vital strategic command and control functions. Finally, Pakistan could adopt a launch-on-warning posture to guard against an Indian pre-emptive attack. This thesis concludes by recommending steps that the United States could take to ensure peace and decrease de-stabilizing factors in the region.

This thesis assesses the potential for a specific type of accidental nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Known as inadvertent war, such a conflict would be the result of a mistaken attempt at preemption, the launching of a nuclear attack by one nation in the mistaken belief that the other was doing likewise or was about to do so. While nuclear weapons can ordinarily be expected to exert a sobering influence on decision-makers, an escalating spiral of military activity during a crisis may generate different situational imperatives. Inadvertent war becomes possible when decision- makers perceive that conflict is inevitable and that there is a significant advantage in striking first. Evidence suggests that there is good reason for concern about the threat of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. The nuclear force structures adopted by India and Pakistan can be expected to exert a particularly strong influence on the potential for both of the necessary conditions for inadvertent war. The current arsenals of these countries, small and heavily dependant upon aircraft for weapons delivery, may invite preemption in the event that nuclear war appears imminent. If India and Pakistan increase their nuclear delivery capabilities by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the potential for inadvertent war will be even greater. In the context of a military confrontation in South Asia, ballistic missiles are likely to contribute both to perceptions of first-strike advantage and to reinforcing military alerts that can lead to the belief that nuclear war is inevitable.

This volume represents a comprehensive and detailed case study of the long-running conflict between India and Pakistan - primarily over the contested territory of Kashmir, and the involvement of the United States within that conflict. The book details the history of 'Partition', the critical event in the modern history of the subcontinent and the fundamental catalyst for the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. It provides a summary description and analysis of the characteristics - demographic, social-cultural, political, economic and military - of the three primary actors that are party to the conflict: the sovereign states of India and Pakistan and the territory of Kashmir. It explains the history of US policy toward India and Pakistan as individual countries as well as US policy toward the conflict between them, particularly in light of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 and events since September 11, 2001. In addition, the volume also describes and analyzes the involvement of three other major extra-regional actors.

This handbook presents an authoritative overview of South Asia through the lens of geopolitics, political dynamics, economics, human security, and sustainable development. It brings together key insights from various disciplines to provide an in-depth understanding of the genesis, course, and future potential of South Asia as a region. The handbook: Explores the post-colonial political landscape of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan and Afghanistan and analyses the challenges to political stability and governance in South Asia Studies the opportunities and challenges produced by globalization and recommends solutions towards greater connectivity and trade in South Asia Delves into the issues of climate change, water and land resource dependency, and energy security and singles out policy challenges as well as positive actions to promote sustainable development and implement the blue economy Discusses the political dynamics of regional cooperation between countries and the role of China in South Asian regional affairs An invaluable addition to the study of South Asia, this volume will be an indispensable resource for scholars, teachers and researchers of political science, international relations, South Asia studies, South Asian politics, history, defence and strategic studies, political economy, developmental studies, public policy and sustainability studies.

The India–Pakistan border in Jammu & Kashmir has witnessed repeated ceasefire violations (CFVs) over the past decade. As relations between India and Pakistan have deteriorated, CFVs have increased exponentially. It is imperative to gain a deeper understanding of these violations owing to their potential to not only cause a crisis but also escalate an ongoing one. Line on Fire, part of the Oxford International Relations in South Asia series, postulates that the incorrect diagnosis of the reasons behind CFVs has led to wrong policies being adopted by both India and Pakistan to deal with the recurrent violations. Using fresh empirical data and first-hand accounts, the volume attempts to understand the reason why CFVs continue to take place between India and Pakistan despite consistent efforts to reduce the tension between the two nations. In doing so, it recontextualizes and enriches the prevailing arguments in contemporary literature on escalating dynamics and unenduring ceasefire agreements between the two South Asian nuclear rivals.

An impending nuclear holocaust is likely to happen, if the world community does not take action. A conflict that has been simmering for many years is beginning to spiral out of control. Two nuclear powers have an unresolved dispute that has increased tensions in the region. Both countries are purchasing and developing sophisticated state-of-the-art weapons that could unleash great terror and destruction on the populations of both countries – with also serious global ramifications. The world’s most dangerous flashpoint, has the highest chance of a nuclear war occurring – it is deemed by many to be more serious that the Cuban Missile Crisis and North Korea’s nuclear sabre rattling. The dispute needs to be amicably resolved between both nations and confidence building measures need to be implemented.

The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union has not eliminated the threat posed to international security by nuclear weapons. The Soviet breakup actually created a new set of dangers: the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the illicit transfer of nuclear warheads, technology, or expertise to the Third World. The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War analyzes the danger of nuclear inadvertence lurking in the command and control systems of the nuclear superpowers. Foreign policy expert Bruce G. Blair identifies the cold war roots of the contemporary risks and outlines a comprehensive policy agenda to strengthen control over nuclear forces. Based on discussions with numerous U.S. and Russian experts, including Russian launch officers who served in the strategic rocket forces and ballistic missile submarines, this book reveals a wealth of new facts about the hidden history of U.S. and Soviet nuclear crisis alerts and exercises. It is a richly detailed, rigorous, and authoritative account of nuclear operations and overturns much conventional wisdom on the subject.

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.