Clinton Peacekeeping And Humanitarian Interventionism

This volume re-examines the evidence surrounding the rise and fall of peacekeeping policy during the first Clinton Administration. Specifically, it asks: what happened to cause the Clinton Executive to abandon its previously favoured policy platform of humanitarian multilateralism? Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism aims to satisfy a large gap in our understanding of events surrounding 1990s peacekeeping policy, humanitarian intervention and the Rwandan genocide, as well as shedding some light on US policy on Africa, and the issues surrounding the current peacekeeping debate. Leonie Murray takes an unorthodox stance with regard to the role of public opinion on peacekeeping policy, and delves deeper into the roles that the legislature, the military, and in particular, the executive had to play in the development of US peacekeeping policy in the 1990s. The conclusions reached concerning the role of the United States and the International Community in the face of the Rwandan Genocide are of particular note in their departure from the accepted wisdom on the subject. This book will be of interest to students of peacekeeping, international relations, US foreign policy and humanitarian intervention.

This fascinating study examines the dynamic process through which the Clinton administration developed a policy towards UN peace support operations. The author addresses the fundamental question: what factors influenced the shift in US policy towards the United Nations and its peace support operations and which factors were clearly dominant? Based on primary sources and interviews with political personalities and officials, the author examines four main factors which shaped the development of policy: the Executive branch, the bureaucracies (the State Department and Department of Defense), Congress and public opinion. These provide the basis for the core chapters of the book, which also contains a chapter on methodology and a chapter of summary analysis.

While the 1990s gave rise to a wealth of literature on the notion of ethical foreign policy, it has tended to simply focus on a version of realism, which overlooks the role of ethics in international affairs. This book explores ethical realism as a theoretical framework.

This Council Policy Initiative frames the issues raised by the "ClintonDoctrine", which advocates U.S. military intervention against large-scale humanitarian abuses. The introduction offers a hypothetical memorandum prepared by a national security adviser to the president, setting forth relevant precedents and context. Three perspectives on U.S. policy options follow, written as speeches theU.S. president might make to the American people: one, humanitarian intervention can serve national interests; two, humanitarian interests alone do not justify military intervention; and three, strategic interest and moral imperative must be balanced.

"The author argues that American policymakers must take an approach based on "principled judgment" when deciding on the use of force. The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Throughout American history, debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives like regional security and stopping humanitarian disasters in regions with few tangible U.S. interests. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies."--SSI site.

Publisher Fact Sheet Draws upon case studies - including Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, & Lebanon - & suggests political & military guidelines for potential U.S. military interventions ranging from peacekeeping & humanitarian operations to preventative strikes & all-out warfare.

Peace operations are increasingly on the front line in the international community’s fight against organized crime; this book explores how, in some cases, peace operations and organized crime are clear enemies, while in others, they may become tacit allies. The threat posed by organized crime to international and human security has become a matter of considerable strategic concern for national and international decision-makers, so it is somewhat surprising how little thought has been devoted to addressing the complex relationship between organized crime and peace operations. This volume addresses this gap, questioning the emerging orthodoxy that portrays organized crime as an external threat to the liberal peace championed by western and allied states and delivered through peace operations. Based upon a series of case studies it concludes that organized crime is both a potential enemy and a potential ally of peace operations, and it argues for the need to distinguish between strategies to contain organized crime and strategies to transform the political economies in which it flourishes. The editors argue for the development of intelligent, transnational, and transitional law enforcement that can make the most of organized crime as a potential ally for transforming political economies, while at the same time containing the threat it presents as an enemy to building effective and responsible states. The book will be of great interest to students of peacebuilding, peace and conflict studies, organised crime, Security Studies and IR in general.

This book offers a new perspective on peace missions in intra-state wars, based on comparative field research. In theoretical terms, this book proposes a new definition of peace operation success based on two crucial elements: the (re)establishment of order and the accomplishment of the mandate. The work presents a new typology for assessing peace operations as failures, partial failures, partial successes, or successes. This focus on ‘blurry’ outcomes provides a clearer theoretical framework to understand what constitutes successful peace operations. It explains the different outcomes of peace operations (based on the type of success/failure) by outlining the effect(s) of the combination of the key ingredients-strategy and the type of interveners. Empirically, this book tests the saliency of the theoretical framework by examining the peace operations which took place in Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. This book refutes the classification of these three cases as the ‘worst’ context for ‘transitional politics’, and demonstrates that peace operations may succeed, partially of totally, in challenging contexts, and that the diverse outcomes are better explained by the type of intervener and the strategy employed than by the type of context. This work shows that, for a peace operation in an intra-state war, the adoption of a deterrence strategy works best for re-establishing order while the involvement of a great power facilitates the accomplishment of the mandate. This book will be of much interest to students of peacekeeping, conflict resolution, civil wars, security studies and IR in general.