Concepts In Thought Action And Emotion

In recent years, the idea of a concept has become increasingly central to different areas of philosophy. This collection of original essays presents philosophical perspectives on the link between concepts and language, concepts and experience, concepts and know-how, and concepts and emotion. The essays span a variety of interrelated philosophical domains ranging from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of emotions. Among the central questions addressed by the contributors are: What are concepts? What is nonconceptual content? Does perceptual experience have conceptual content? Is conceptual thought language dependent? How do we form new concepts? Does practical knowledge have propositional content? Is practical understanding conceptual (without being propositional)? Do emotions have a representational content and if so, is the representational content conceptual? Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion advances current debates about concepts and will interest scholars across a broad range of philosophical disciplines.

This chapter briefly describes the general goals of the book, introduces the most fundamental features of the methodology that is employed to achieve these goals, and gives an outline of the structure of the book. A more detailed account of the goals and methodology is presented in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. What the Book Is About The main objective of this study is to attempt to answer the question: How do people understand their emotions? As we shall see in the next chapter, a large number of scholars have tried to provide answers to this question. The interest in the way people understand their emotions has led scholars to the issue of the nature of emotion concepts and emotional meaning. Since the notion of understanding involves or presupposes the notions of concept and meaning, it was only natural for scholars with an interest in the way people understand their emotions to tum their attention to emo tion concepts and the meaning associated with emotion terms. So the broader issue has often become more specific. For example, Davitz in his The Language of Emotion formulated the central question in the following way: "What does a person mean when he says someone is happy or angry or sad?" (Davitz 1969: 1).

Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have distinguished themselves in the field of emotion research and have interdisciplinary interests, particularly in the social and biological sciences. The reader will find a lively variety of positions on topics such as the nature of emotion, the category of "emotion," the rationality of emotions, the relationship between an emotion and its expression, the relationship between emotion, motivation, and action, the biological nature versus social construction of emotion, the role of the body in emotion, the extent of freedom and our control of emotions, the relationship between emotion and value, and the very nature and warrant of theories of emotion. In addition, this book acknowledges that it is impossible to study the emotions today without engaging with contemporary psychology and the neurosciences, and moreover engages them with zeal. Thus the essays included here should appeal to a broad spectrum of emotion researchers in the various theoretical, experimental, and clinical branches of psychology, in addition to theorists in philosophy, philosophical psychology, moral psychology, and cognitive science, the social sciences, and literary theory.

In Everyday Conceptions of Emotion, prominent anthropologists, linguists and psychologists come together for the first time to discuss how emotions are conceptualised by people of different cultures and ages, speaking different languages. Anger, fear, jealousy and emotion itself are concepts that are bound up with the English language, embedded in a way of thinking, acting and speaking. At the same time, the metaphors underlying such concepts are often similar across languages, and children of different cultures follow common developmental pathways. The book thus discusses the interplay of social and cultural factors that humans share in their development of an understanding of the affective side of their lives. For researchers interested in emotion, development of concepts and language, cultural and linguistic influences on psychological processes.

First published in 1977, Emotion, Thought and Therapy is a study of Hume and Spinoza and the relationship of philosophical theories of the emotions to psychological theories of therapy. Jerome Neu argues that the Spinozists are closer to the truth; that is, that thoughts are of greater importance than feelings in the classification and discrimination of emotional states. He then contends that if the Spinozists are closer to the truth, we have the beginning of an argument to show that Freudian or analytic therapies make philosophic sense. Throughout the book, careful attention is paid to modern discussions in philosophy of mind and psychology, and materials from anthropology and other relevant disciplines are considered. At the centre of the discussion is the notion of ‘thought-dependence’. Therapies for psychological disorders are placed along a spectrum in accordance with the role they assign to thoughts. The Spinozist view of the emotions can be seen as at the extreme thought end of a corresponding spectrum of theories of the emotions. The book suggests that this stream may help explain the spectrum of therapeutic theories and the possibilities that exist for psychological development and change. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy, psychology and counselling.

In this provocative contribution to the philosophy of science and mind, Paul E. Griffiths criticizes contemporary philosophy and psychology of emotion for failing to take in an evolutionary perspective and address current work in neurobiology and cognitive science. Reviewing the three current models of emotion, Griffiths points out their deficiencies and constructs a basis for future models that pay equal attention to biological fact and conceptual rigor. "Griffiths has written a work of depth and clarity in an area of murky ambiguity, producing a much-needed standard at the border of science, philosophy, and psychology. . . . As he presents his case, offering a forthright critique of past and present theories, Griffiths touches on such issues as evolution, social construction, natural kinds (categories corresponding with real distinctions in nature), cognition, and moods. While addressing specialists, the book will reward general readers who apply themselves to its remarkably accessible style."—Library Journal "What Emotions Really Are makes a strong claim to be one of the best books to have emerged on the subject of human emotion."—Ray Dolan, Nature

How does a person’s way of thinking influence their personality, their values and their choice of career? In this important study, originally published in 1985, Susan Aylwin uses such questions as a starting point for elucidating the relationship between thought and feeling. Three modes of thought are compared in detail: inner speech, visual imagery and enactive imagery – the last being an important addition to our understanding of mental representations. The structural characteristics of all three types are analysed using an association technique. Their affective aspects are then explored through a variety of means, including the analysis of daydreams, an examination of the evaluative complements of categorizing, the study of cognitive style, an exploration of such social feelings as embarrassment, and the experiential study of strong emotion. The author ends by integrating her findings, showing how thought and feeling are related aspects of the temporal organization of consciousness. Structure in Thought and Feeling is written in a lively and accessible style, and brings a refreshing perspective to many issues of central concern to psychologists interested in cognition, emotion, personality and psychotherapy.