Cyberspace And Instability

Reconceptualises instability in relation to cyberspace

As this report discusses, cyberspace is an inherently unstable national security domain. Its fundamental characteristics, such as the low cost of entry, abundant access points, and the difficulty of attribution, alter traditional power calculations. This enables non-state actors to wage proxy warfare on cyber battlefields, beyond national accountability or control. The vulnerability of national critical infrastructure endangers whole civilian populations, and places private enterprises on the front lines. Additionally, the absence of international norms and comparatively low costs of cyber attacks create incentives for nations to launch preemptive strikes in a coercive attempt to forestall more traditional kinetic conflict. In such an unstable environment, the consequences of misinterpreted signals between nations may be catastrophic. The principal editors of the volume discussed this cyber instability and its implications for the future of cyberspace, and made key recommendations for future US and international cyber policy. The panel participants examined the implications of an unstable environment in cyberspace for purposes of long-term strategy, military operations, domestic and international law, risk management, and other aspects of national security.

As this report discusses, cyberspace is an inherently unstable national security domain. Its fundamental characteristics, such as the low cost of entry, abundant access points, and the difficulty of attribution, alter traditional power calculations. This enables non-state actors to wage proxy warfare on cyber battlefields, beyond national accountability or control. The vulnerability of national critical infrastructure endangers whole civilian populations, and places private enterprises on the front lines. Additionally, the absence of international norms and comparatively low costs of cyber attacks create incentives for nations to launch preemptive strikes in a coercive attempt to forestall more traditional kinetic conflict. In such an unstable environment, the consequences of misinterpreted signals between nations may be catastrophic. The principal editors of the volume discussed this cyber instability and its implications for the future of cyberspace, and made key recommendations for future US and international cyber policy. The panel participants examined the implications of an unstable environment in cyberspace for purposes of long-term strategy, military operations, domestic and international law, risk management, and other aspects of national security.

The study of cyberspace is relatively new within the field of social sciences, yet interest in the subject is significant. Conflicts, Crimes and Regulations in Cyberspace contributes to the scientific debate being brought to the fore by addressing international and methodological issues, through the use of case studies. This book presents cyberspace as a socio-technical system on an international level. It focuses on state and non-state actors, as well as the study of strategic concepts and norms. Unlike global studies, the socio-technical approach and “meso” scale facilitate the analysis of cyberspace in international relations. This is an area of both collaboration and conflict for which specific modes of regulation have appeared.

Over the past decade, numerous states have declared cyberspace as a new domain of warfare, sought to develop a military cyber strategy and establish a cyber command. These developments have led to much policy talk and concern about the future of warfare as well as the digital vulnerability of society. No Shortcuts provides a level-headed view of where we are in the militarization of cyberspace.In this book, Max Smeets bridges the divide between technology and policy to assess the necessary building blocks for states to develop a military cyber capacity. Smeets argues that for many states, the barriers to entry into conflict in cyberspace are currently too high. Accompanied by a wide range of empirical examples, Smeets shows why governments abilities to develop military cyber capabilities might change over time and explains the limits of capability transfer by states and private actors.

Analogies help us think, learn, and communicate. The fourteen case studies in this volume help readers make sense of contemporary cyber conflict through historical analogies to past military-technological problems. The chapters are divided into three groups. The first--What Are Cyber Weapons Like?--examines the characteristics of cyber capabilities and how their use for intelligence gathering, signaling, and precision strike compares with earlier technologies for such missions. The second section--What Might Cyber Wars Be Like?--explores how lessons from several wars since the early 19th century, including the World Wars, could apply or not apply to cyber conflict in the 21st century. The final section--What Is Preventing and/or Managing Cyber Conflict Like?--offers lessons from 19th and 20th century cases of managing threatening actors and technologies.

"In 'Cyber Persistence Theory', Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that this current theory only works well in the cyber strategic space of armed conflict but it is completely misaligned for conflict outside of war - where most state-sponsored adversarial cyber activity occurs. As they show, the reigning paradigm of deterrence theory cannot fully explain what is taking place with respect to cyber conflict. Therefore, the authors develop a novel approach to national cyber security strategy and policy that realigns theory and practice."--

This timely Research Handbook contains an analysis of various legal questions concerning cyberspace and cyber activities and provides a critical account of their effectiveness. Expert contributors examine the application of fundamental international la