General Hieu Arvn

Brigadier General George Wear once noted, "When the ARVN troops were well led they fought as well as anyone's soldiers. They simply needed commanders who would support them properly and who could win their confidence and make them believe that their cause was worth risking their lives for." General Hieu had been one of such commanders. Colonel John Hayes, 5th ARVN Division senior advisor remarked in 1970, "General Hieu is an above average commander. Good qualities include dedication, experience as a combat leader, ability to stimulate and maintain morale, and ability to control those in his command. He is quite religious and patriotic, and demands high standards of conduct and discipline. He is methodical but decisive. He is rated better than the average US Division commander in overall performance." American Veterans who had served in Vietnam might be interested in knowing that General Hieu had collaborated closely with the following American units: USMC HMM-364, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 174th Assault Helicopter Company, 1st Battalion/50th Mechanized Infantry, 7/15th Field Artillery Battalion, 19th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 12th Aviation Group and 3rd Squadron/17th Air Cavalry. * General Hieu was obviously a great soldier who put his country and his people foremost. (General Fred C. Weyand) * Biography of a South Vietnam general officer who has been likened to Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, and LeClerc. He was much admired by Vietnamese civilians and respected by his American advisors. (Douglas Pike) * This book sheds light on the ARVN Forces never before told. (Darryl Nelson) * I do not see how anyone studying the Vietnam War on the ARVN side can neglect your book at all. (James Miguez)

This biography, a reader would notice at the outset, was not written by a historian, an investigative reporter, or a professional biographer. It originates instead from the pen of a younger sibling seeking to resolve the mystery surrounding his brother's untimely death. This legitimate curiosity has evolved into a collection of articles depicting General Hieu as a family man, a patriot, a military strategist, and a man of integrity. This collection of articles authored by siblings, friends and fellow military men unexpectedly converges to project a dynamic image of an intelligent soldier and brilliant strategist engaged in the twofold quixotic tasks of overcoming a corrupted military hierarchy and fighting the invading North Vietnamese communist army. The book presents the reader with glimpses of a man living the yin aspect of the Vietnamese society (egalitarian, flexible, spiritual, congenial) and, at the same time, confronting the yang aspect of the neo-Confucianist military and government hierarchy (male dominant, rigid, self-serving, elitist, concerned with face and status). Without any claim to being systematic or thorough in his research, the author has nevertheless gathered a number of revealing personal anecdotes, testimonies from living witnesses, declassified documents from the National Archives, letters from former military academy classmates, phone interviews, excerpts from books, and so forth. From this cacophony of voices emerges the image of a virtuous man, caring father, loving spouse, and competent general respected by Vietnamese and American military personnel of all ranks. The reader would no doubt be surprised to discover this unsung hero in the stark background of negative memories of the Vietnam War and betrayal of the people by the neo-Confucianist military and government hierarchy. Though modest in its presentation, the book managed to do justice to a dedicated soldier and competent general, who was mostly unknown to both the Vietnamese and the American public. After reading this fascinating biography, the reader comes away wondering what might have been had this uncommon general, who epitomized the true Vietnamese people, been allowed to fully exercise his military competence.

Brigadier General George Wear once noted, "When the ARVN troops were well led they fought as well as anyone's soldiers. They simply needed commanders who would support them properly and who could win their confidence and make them believe that their cause was worth risking their lives for." General Hieu had been one of such commanders. Colonel John Hayes, 5th ARVN Division senior advisor remarked in 1970, "General Hieu is an above average commander. Good qualities include dedication, experience as a combat leader, ability to stimulate and maintain morale, and ability to control those in his command. He is quite religious and patriotic, and demands high standards of conduct and discipline. He is methodical but decisive. He is rated better than the average US Division commander in overall performance." American Veterans who had served in Vietnam might be interested in knowing that General Hieu had collaborated closely with the following American units: USMC HMM-364, 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 174th Assault Helicopter Company, 1st Battalion/50th Mechanized Infantry, 7/15th Field Artillery Battalion, 19th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 12th Aviation Group and 3rd Squadron/17th Air Cavalry. * General Hieu was obviously a great soldier who put his country and his people foremost. (General Fred C. Weyand) * Biography of a South Vietnam general officer who has been likened to Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, and LeClerc. He was much admired by Vietnamese civilians and respected by his American advisors. (Douglas Pike) * This book sheds light on the ARVN Forces never before told. (Darryl Nelson) * I do not see how anyone studying the Vietnam War on the ARVN side can neglect your book at all. (James Miguez)

During its struggle for survival from 1954 to 1975, the region known as the Central Highlands was the strategically vital high ground for the South Vietnamese state. Successive South Vietnamese governments, their American allies, and their Communist enemies all realized early on the fundamental importance of this region. Paul Harris's new book, based on research in American archives and the use of Vietnamese Communist literature on a very large scale, examines the struggle for this region from the mid-1950s, tracing its evolution from subversion through insurgency and counterinsurgency to the bigger battles of 1965. The rugged mountains, high plateaus, and dense jungles of the Central Highlands seemed as forbidding to most Vietnamese as it did to most Americans. During 1954 to 1965, the great majority of its inhabitants were not ethnic Vietnamese. Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime initially supported an American counterinsurgency alliance with the Highlanders only to turn dramatically against it. As the war progressed, however, the Central Highlands became increasingly important. It was the area through which most branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed. With its rugged, jungle-clad terrain, it also seemed to the North Vietnamese the best place to destroy the elite of South Vietnam's armed forces and to fight initial battles with the Americans. For many North Vietnamese, however, the Central Highlands became a living hell of starvation and disease. Even before the arrival of the American 1st Cavalry Division, the Communists were generally unable to win the decisive victories they sought in this region. Harris's study culminates with an account of the campaign in Pleiku province in October to November—a campaign that led to dramatic clashes between the Americans and the North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang valley. Harris's analysis overturns many of the accepted accounts about NVA, US, and ARVN performances.

A riveting combination of war memoir and analysis providing “valuable insights” into the role of military intelligence in Vietnam (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence). For the first two weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972, the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment provided the only pertinent collateral intelligence available to American forces. Twice daily, the Detachment provided intelligence to the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), US Navy SEALS, and Special Forces units, including tactical and strategic forecasts of enemy movements, information that was otherwise unavailable to U.S. units and advisors in-country. Bob Baker was an intelligence analyst who was there. In the weeks before the offensive, vital agent reports and verbal warnings by the 571st MI Detachment had been ignored by all the major commands; they were only heeded, and then only very reluctantly, once the offensive began. This refusal to listen to the intelligence explains why no Army or USMC organizations were on-call to recover prisoners discovered or U.S. personnel downed behind enemy lines, as in the BAT-21 incident, as the last two Combat Recon Platoons in Vietnam had been disbanded six weeks before the offensive began. The lessons and experiences of Operation Lam Son 719 in the previous year were ignored, especially with regard to the NVA’s tactical use of tanks and artillery. In his memoir, Baker, the only trained military intelligence analyst with the 571st MI Detachment in 1972, reveals these and other heroics and blunders during a key moment in the Vietnam War.

What Americans call the Vietnam War actually began in December 1946 with a struggle between the communists and the French for possession of the country—but Vietnam’s strategic position in southeast Asia inevitably led to the involvement of other countries. Written by an officer in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, this poignant memoir seeks to clarify the nuances of South Vietnam’s defeat. From the age of 12, Van Nguyen Duong watched as the conflict affected his home, family, village and friends. He discusses not only the day-to-day hardships of wartime but his postwar forced relocation and eventual imprisonment. A special focus is on the anguish caused by the illusive reality of Vietnamese independence. The political forces at work north and south, the hardships suffered by RVNAF soldiers after the 1975 U.S. withdrawal, and the effects of reunification on the Vietnamese people are discussed.

The Vietnam war continues to be the focus of intense controversy. While most people-liberals, conservatives, Democrats, Republicans, historians, pundits, and citizens alike-agree that the United States did not win the war, a vocal minority argue the opposite or debate why victory never came, attributing the quagmire to everything from domestic politics to the press. The military never lost a battle, how then did it not win the war? Stepping back from this overheated fray, bestselling author John Prados takes a fresh look at both the war and the debates about it to produce a much-needed and long-overdue reassessment of one of our nation's most tragic episodes. Drawing upon several decades of research—including recently declassified documents, newly available presidential tapes, and a wide range of Vietnamese and other international sources—Prados's magisterial account weaves together multiple perspectives across an epic-sized canvas where domestic politics, ideologies, nations, and militaries all collide. Prados patiently pieces back together the events and moments, from the end of World War II until our dispiriting departure from Vietnam in 1975, that reveal a war that now appears to have been truly unwinnable—due to opportunities lost, missed, ignored, or refused. He shows how-from the Truman through the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations—American leaders consistently ignored or misunderstood the realities in Southeast Asia and passed up every opportunity to avoid war in the first place or avoid becoming ever more mired in it after it began. Highlighting especially Ike's seminal and long-lasting influence on our Vietnam policy, Prados demonstrates how and why our range of choices narrowed with each passing year, while our decision-making continued to be distorted by Cold War politics and fundamental misperceptions about the culture, psychology, goals, and abilities of both our enemies and our allies in Vietnam. By turns engaging narrative history, compelling analytic treatise, and moving personal account, Prados's magnum opus challenges previous authors and should rightfully take its place as the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and accurate one-volume account of a war that—judging by the frequent analogies to the current war in Iraq—has not yet really ended for any of us.

War.