Indonesia Anatomy Of A Banking Crisis

This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges. This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges. This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges.

Economic crisis and banking restructuring policy in Indonesia.

This important book is set to be a key document for those interested in Indonesia's recent economic and political history. There have been many unanswered questions about exactly how the regional currency crisis snowballed into a full-scale banking crisis in Indonesia, coupled with a total loss of credibility within a short time. This record by the official in the midst of the banking crisis, the ex governor of Bank Indonesia, gives a fuller and intriguing picture of the events, including the actions of President Soeharto, as well as a balanced account of the much criticised interventions by the International Monetary Fund. The author also analyses the lessons for monetary policy to avoid future such crisis. This is essential reading for economists and Indonesia watchers.

Interventions in banks are often an integral element of a government’s program for addressing a systemic banking crisis. Interventions may be warranted because the banks are deeply insolvent or riddled with fraud; they may be requiring substantial liquidity support. In some circumstances closures may be more effective than open bank resolution. There were four major sets of bank closures in Indonesia between November 1997 and March 1999. The initial closures were subject to criticism, but the more recent ones were viewed more positively. This paper looks at these experiences, and draws conclusions about closing banks in a systemic crisis.

This important book is set to be a key document for those interested in Indonesia's recent economic and political history. There have been many unanswered questions about exactly how the regional currency crisis snowballed into a full-scale banking crisis in Indonesia, coupled with a total loss of credibility within a short time. This record by the official in the midst of the banking crisis, the ex governor of Bank Indonesia, gives a fuller and intriguing picture of the events, including the actions of President Soeharto, as well as a balanced account of the much criticised interventions by the International Monetary Fund. The author also analyses the lessons for monetary policy to avoid future such crisis. This is essential reading for economists and Indonesia watchers.

This paper studies why currency and monetary shock hit Indonesia's economy and banking sector so severely and the measures that were taken to deal with the banking crisis, the lessons learned, and challenges faced in restructuring and strengthening the banking system. The vulnerable state of the banking sector, in combination with exchange rate and interest rate shocks, led to a systemic banking crisis. The priorities for bank restructuring are to complete the separation of nonviable from viable banks, recoup losses, implement new rules and regulations, and develop an incentive-based system for the consolidation of banks.

This paper studies why currency and monetary shock hit Indonesia's economy and banking sector so severely and the measures that were taken to deal with the banking crisis, the lessons learned, and challenges faced in restructuring and strengthening the banking system. The vulnerable state of the banking sector, in combination with exchange rate and interest rate shocks, led to a systemic banking crisis. The priorities for bank restructuring are to complete the separation of nonviable from viable banks, recoup losses, implement new rules and regulations, and develop an incentive-based system for the consolidation of banks.

In 1997 Indonesia experienced a severe financial crisis due to problems in its banking system. The central objective of this study is to analyze the Indonesian government's banking system policies, identify the causes of the financial crisis and analyze the government's efforts in response to the crisis. This thesis investigates the government's policies and its efforts in reviving the banking sector by using archival research, as well as a literature search of books, magazine articles, Internet articles, newspaper articles, and other library information sources. A program of recapitalization and restructurization of the banking system was a prime factor in the economic recovery in Indonesia. One lesson learned was that the central bank, as the monetary authority was not free from external pressure, especially from the government As a result, policies were adopted to respond to immediate problems as they arose, without consideration of broader economic consequences, which in turn created other unforeseen problems. When a new Indonesian government rose to power, it improved the legal foundation of the monetary authority to make decisions, by clarifying its power and duties, and protecting it from external intervention or pressures. The monetary authority now has the independence and power to implement policies based on sound economic principles.