Bank Indonesia And The Crisis

This important book is set to be a key document for those interested in Indonesia's recent economic and political history. There have been many unanswered questions about exactly how the regional currency crisis snowballed into a full-scale banking crisis in Indonesia, coupled with a total loss of credibility within a short time. This record by the official in the midst of the banking crisis, the ex governor of Bank Indonesia, gives a fuller and intriguing picture of the events, including the actions of President Soeharto, as well as a balanced account of the much criticised interventions by the International Monetary Fund. The author also analyses the lessons for monetary policy to avoid future such crisis. This is essential reading for economists and Indonesia watchers.

This important book is set to be a key document for those interested in Indonesia's recent economic and political history. There have been many unanswered questions about exactly how the regional currency crisis snowballed into a full-scale banking crisis in Indonesia, coupled with a total loss of credibility within a short time. This record by the official in the midst of the banking crisis, the ex governor of Bank Indonesia, gives a fuller and intriguing picture of the events, including the actions of President Soeharto, as well as a balanced account of the much criticised interventions by the International Monetary Fund. The author also analyses the lessons for monetary policy to avoid future such crisis. This is essential reading for economists and Indonesia watchers.

This important book is set to be a key document for those interested in Indonesia's recent economic and political history. There have been many unanswered questions about exactly how the regional currency crisis snowballed into a full-scale banking crisis in Indonesia, coupled with a total loss of credibility within a short time. This record by the official in the midst of the banking crisis, the ex governor of Bank Indonesia, gives a fuller and intriguing picture of the events, including the actions of President Soeharto, as well as a balanced account of the much criticised interventions by the International Monetary Fund. The author also analyses the lessons for monetary policy to avoid future such crisis. This is essential reading for economists and Indonesia watchers.

Interventions in banks are often an integral element of a government’s program for addressing a systemic banking crisis. Interventions may be warranted because the banks are deeply insolvent or riddled with fraud; they may be requiring substantial liquidity support. In some circumstances closures may be more effective than open bank resolution. There were four major sets of bank closures in Indonesia between November 1997 and March 1999. The initial closures were subject to criticism, but the more recent ones were viewed more positively. This paper looks at these experiences, and draws conclusions about closing banks in a systemic crisis.

This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges. This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges. This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges.

Economic crisis and banking restructuring policy in Indonesia.

This report evaluates the role of the IMF in three capital account crises, in Indonesia (1997-98), Korea (1997-98), and Brazil (1998-99), and the lessons to be drawn from the experience. It also recommends steps aimed at making the IMF’s surveillance and program design more effective in the prevention and management of future capital account crises. Annexes contain the three country case studies that form the basis for the judgments for the report.