Japanese Diplomacy In A Dilemma

The question of how to maintain the continuity of diplomacy while developing democracy without military intervention is an old and new issue. The challenge can be described as a dilemma between democracy and diplomatic coherence. This dilemma is not unique to the twenty-first century; it has been a constant challenge to the development of democracy. In non-Western countries, democratisation originated in the nineteenth century and has had many successes and failures. After the Russo-Japanese War, political parties began to take power in Japan. The best embodiment of diplomacy in Japan’s emerging democracy—the development of parliamentary democracy and mass-based democracy—is Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951), who served as foreign minister from 1924 to 1927 and from 1929 to 1931, and was prime minister from 1945 to 1946. As a diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shidehara had long grappled with the issue of how to ensure diplomatic coherence in modern Japan, which was becoming increasingly democratic. Although Shidehara succeeded to some extent in promoting diplomacy in cooperation with the US and the UK under party politics, the rise of the military after the Manchurian Incident forced him to retire for a period. However, after the Pacific War, Shidehara became prime minister of the US-occupied Japan and attempted to restore cooperative diplomacy under party politics. Shidehara came to the conclusion that the way to achieve both democracy and diplomatic coherence was through nonpartisan diplomacy towards peace. This book examines the tension between diplomacy and democracy, focusing on Shidehara’s life and exploring modern Japan’s footsteps. Shidehara was undoubtedly one of Japan’s most important diplomatic figures.

This study of the Pearl Harbor attack clarifies the debate in two important ways: first, it definitively exposes who delayed Japan's notice of war to the United States, a serious blunder which stigmatized Japan for launching a premeditated "sneak attack", and second, it examines how the Foreign Ministry has dealt with this blunder from the immediate postwar period to the present. Sugihara's aim in both instances is to reevaluate just how costly this error by the Foreign Ministry has been for Japan, and to show how its cover-up and mishandling have distorted postwar Japanese diplomacy.Sugihara demonstrates how the protracted cover-up of the bungled war notice to the United States has severely distorted the way Japan understands its recent past. Deeply concerned with the Ministry's continuing lack of apology to the United States (and the Japanese public) for causing the "sneak attack", he presents its misguided handling of several war-related issues, such as its role in the portrayal of the Nanking Incident in high school textbooks, and its treatment of ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine. While due credit is given for the Ministry's overdue attempt in November 1994 to address this shameful episode, the author suggests future directions for Japanese diplomacy and delivers a strong moral message about diplomacy and justice.Significantly, Sugihara's is the only extensive analysis in English that exploits newly-declassified documents concerning the suppressed 1946 internal Foreign Ministry investigation of the blunder. Under mounting public pressure, the Ministry in November 1994 made these materials public, and they reveal for the first time precisely when Ministry officials determined whose negligence had caused the delay at Japan's Washington embassy. Critically, the author shows that the ultimate blame for the drawn-out concealment of these documents lies with former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida, whose shameless protection of Katsuzo Okumura and Sadao Iguchi, the embassy officials responsible for

This book provides a detailed examination of Japan's diplomatic relations in the 1950s, an important decade in international affairs when new structures and systems emerged, and when Japan established patterns in its international relationships which continue today. It examines the process of Japan's attempts to rehabilitate itself and reintegrate into a changing world, and the degree of success to which Japan achieved its goals in the political, economic and security spheres. The book is divided into three parts, each containing three chapters: Part I looks at Japan in the eyes of the Anglo-American powers; Part II at Japanese efforts to gain membership of newly forming regional and international organizations; and Part III considers the role of domestic factors in Japanese foreign policy making. Important issues are considered including Japanese rearmament and the struggle to gain entry into the United Nations. In contrast to much of the academic literature on post-war Japanese diplomacy, generally presenting Japan as a passive actor of little relevance or importance, this book shows that Japan did not simply sit passively by, but formed and attempted to instigate its own visions into the evolving regional and global structures. It also shows that whilst Japan did not always figure as highly as its politicians and policy makers may have liked in the foreign policy considerations of other nation states, many countries and organizations did attach a great deal of importance to re-building relations with Japan throughout this period of re-adjustment and transformation.