Reflection And The Stability Of Belief

A unifying theme of Loeb's work is epistemological - that Descartes and Hume advance theories of knowledge that rely on a substantial 'naturalistic' component, adopting one or another member of a cluster of psychological properties of beliefs as the goal of inquiry and the standard for assessing belief-forming mechanisms. Thus Loeb shows a surprising affinity between the epistemologies of the two figures -- surprising because they are often thought of as polar opposites in this respect. Descartes and Hume are unique in that their philosophical texts are accessible beyond just a narrow audience in the history of philosophy; their ideas continue to be a vital part of the field at large. This volume will thus appeal to advanced students and scholars not just in the history of early modern philosophy but in epistemology and other core areas of the discipline.

A unifying theme of Loeb's work is epistemological - that Descartes and Hume advance theories of knowledge that rely on a substantial 'naturalistic' component, adopting one or another member of a cluster of psychological properties of beliefs as the goal of inquiry and the standard for assessing belief-forming mechanisms. Thus Loeb shows a surprising affinity between the epistemologies of the two figures -- surprising because they are often thought of as polar opposites in this respect. Descartes and Hume are unique in that their philosophical texts are accessible beyond just a narrow audience in the history of philosophy; their ideas continue to be a vital part of the field at large. This volume will thus appeal to advanced students and scholars not just in the history of early modern philosophy but in epistemology and other core areas of the discipline.

Louis Loeb argues that the paradoxical corollary to Hume's 'stability-based' theory, stated in his 'Treatise on Human Nature', is that no belief generating mechanism is fully stable or justified - for a fully reflective person.

What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all. Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic justification. Smithies builds a sustained argument for the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness which draws on a range of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His position combines two key claims. The first is phenomenal mentalism, which says that epistemic justification is determined by the phenomenally individuated facts about your mental states. The second is accessibilism, which says that epistemic justification is luminously accessible in the sense that you're always in a position to know which beliefs you have epistemic justification to hold. Smithies integrates these two claims into a unified theory of epistemic justification, which he calls phenomenal accessibilism. The book is divided into two parts, which converge on this theory of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part 1 argues from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection. Part 2 argues from the top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Economic and monetary union in the European Union represents a massive change for Europe and for the world. The Road to Maastricht identifies why the agreement was possible and how the agreement was made. The book examines the motives that inspired European political leaders, the strategies that they pursued, and the institutions that were used to achieve monetary union. Drawing on a wide range of sources and unprecedented research and interviews, the book combines careful political analysis with new information about the way in which European Monetary Union was negotiated. It delves into the complex forces at work in Europe, including the cross-national political interactions, to produce an authoritative account of the boldest and riskiest venture in the history of European integration.

The interdependence of boundary questions and the experience of cognitive dissonance reveal that knowledge in all fields of inquiry is always incomplete and tentative. The issues are particularly acute for Christian theological reflection. Ingram illustrates the importance of boundary questions and cognitive dissonance as a means of creatively transforming contemporary Christian theological reflection through dialogue with the natural sciences and the world's religions, particularly Buddhism, filtered through the lenses of Whiteheadian process philosophy.

Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. Philosophers have frequently extolled the value of reflective self-examination, and a wide range of philosophers, who differ on many other things, have argued that reflection can help to solve a number of significant philosophical problems. The importance of reflecting on one's beliefs and desires has been viewed as the key to solving problems about justification and knowledge; about reasoning; about the nature of freedom; and about the source of normativity. In each case, a problem is identified which reflective self-examination is thought to address. Kornblith argues that reflection cannot solve any of these problems. There is a common structure to these issues, and the problems which reflection is thought to resolve are ones which could not possibly be solved by reflecting on one's beliefs and desires. More than this, he suggests that the attempt to solve these problems by appealing to reflection saddles us with a mystical view of the powers of reflective self-examination. Recognition of this fact motivates a search for a demystified view of the nature of reflection. To this end, Kornblith offers a detailed examination of views about knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity in order to better understand the motivations for extolling self-reflective examination. He explores both the logic of these views, and the psychological commitments they involve. In the final chapter, he offers a more realistic view of reflection, which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.

One-day, one-problem is a unique adaptation of problem-based learning (PBL) pioneered at Republic Polytechnic, Singapore. Here students are challenged each day with a problem from their domain and attain the necessary learning outcomes in the process of responding to the problem. Throughout the day students would engage in small group discussions, self-directed learning and conversations with their teacher who plays the role of a facilitator. This approach to learning and instruction represents a new brand of constructivist learning in a more structured learning environment compared to conventional PBL. This book contains a series of chapters by authors with first-hand experience in the One-day,one-problem PBL approach. Unlike other books on PBL, the chapters are both research-informed and practical. Results of empirical studies into the factors of PBL such as quality of problems, tutor behaviours, scaffoldings, student learning and interest are discussed together with practical implications for the educator. The book begins with an overview of the one-day, one-problem process, providing a viewpoint from both the student and tutor. Republic Polytechnic’s pedagogical philosophy and epistemological belief of education are introduced with the intent to share how the polytechnic designed and implemented a system that supports the philosophical beliefs. Results and practical implications of empirical studies on the various factors that influence students’ learning in PBL are discussed. These include the quality of problems and the use of scaffoldings for students’ learning, tutors as facilitators, preparation of staff for PBL, student assessment, how students learn in the process of PBL and student interest.