Selfish Routing And The Price Of Anarchy

An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2004, held in Bergen, Norway, in September 2004. The 70 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed from 208 submissions. The scope of the papers spans the entire range of algorithmics from design and mathematical issues to real-world applications in various fields, and engineering and analysis of algorithms.

One of Springer’s renowned Major Reference Works, this awesome achievement provides a comprehensive set of solutions to important algorithmic problems for students and researchers interested in quickly locating useful information. This first edition of the reference focuses on high-impact solutions from the most recent decade, while later editions will widen the scope of the work. All entries have been written by experts, while links to Internet sites that outline their research work are provided. The entries have all been peer-reviewed. This defining reference is published both in print and on line.

In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2002, held in Malaga, Spain, in July 2002. The 83 revised full papers presented together with 7 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 269 submissions. All current aspects of theoretical computer science are addressed and major new results are presented.

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2017, held in Bangalore, India, in December 2017. The 28 full and 6 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 89 submissions. The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and economics.

This book constitutes the refereed conference proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity, CIAC 2017, held in Athens, Greece, in May 2017. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 90 submissions and are presented together with 3 abstracts of invited talks and a paper to the 70th birthday of Stathis Zachos. The papers present original research in the theory and applications of algorithms and computational complexity.