Strategic Instincts

"A very timely book."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO of New America How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. Strategic Instincts shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.

... dedicated to the advancement and understanding of those principles and practices, military and political, which serve the vital security interests of the United States.

Managing Health Care Business Strategy is the definitive textbook on strategic planning and management for healthcare organizations. It offers all the basic information on strategic planning and management within the unique context of organizations concerned with the delivery and financing of health care. It does this by noting the singular strategic environment in health care, explaining the special procedures and options available to health care organizations, and providing real-life examples in the form of case studies. It includes not only a description of the basic multi-step process of creating and then managing a strategic plan, but also a detailed look at the role played by the key business functions (finance, marketing, human resources, information technology, and law) as well as specific strategic options (merger/acquisition, reorganization, joint venture) and some of the popular tools for analyzing strategic situations (balanced scorecard, Six Sigma, SWOT).

This is the definitive textbook on strategic planning and management in health care organizations for those pursuing a career in health care in undergraduate, business, and medical schools, and ancillary health professions such as nursing or physician assistant, as well as for established health care professionals, including doctors, who are completing programs and degrees in business administration to prepare themselves for greater involvement in the management of health care delivery. This book features all the basic information on strategic planning and management within the unique context of organizations concerned with the delivery and financing of health care. It notes the singular strategic environment in health care, explaining the special procedures and options available to health care organizations, and providing real-life examples in the form of case studies.

When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan - and Gorbechev - completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end. He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.

Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty explores and examines why and how security communities prepare purposefully for their future defence. The author explains that defence planning is the product of interplay among political process, historical experience, and the logic of strategy. The theory of strategy best reveals both the nature and the working of defence planning. Political 'ends', strategic 'ways', and military 'means' all fed by reigning, if not always recognized, assumptions, organize the subject well with a template that can serve any time, place, and circumstance. The book is designed to help understanding of what can appear to be a forbiddingly complex as well as technical subject. A good part of the problem for officials charged with defence planning duties is expressed in the second part of the book's title. The real difficulty, which rarely is admitted by those tasked with defence planning duty, is that defence planning can only be guesswork. But, because defence preparation is always expensive, not untypically is politically unpopular, yet obviously can be supremely important, claims to knowledge about the truly unknowable persist. In truth, we cannot do defence planning competently, because our ignorance of the future precludes understanding of what our society will be shown by future events to need. The challenge faced by the author was to identify ways in which our problems with the inability to know the future in any detail in advance-the laws of nature, in other words-may best be met and mitigated. Professor Gray argues that our understanding of human nature, of politics, and of strategic history, does allow us to make prudent choices in defence planning that hopefully will prove 'good enough'.

The book provides a thorough analysis of strategy formulation at country and company level in Arab countries and corporations. It also deals with the issue of entrepreneurial initiative in Arab countries and issues actual practice of entrepreneurship. Role of the financial markets, especially venture capital and private equity are examined.

A compilation of my writing (except books) from college through retirement