The Law Of Evidence

This book, by David M. Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, is Canada's leading text in evidentiary law in criminal and civil cases. For nearly two decades, it has been relied upon by judges, practitioners, and scholars. In the newest edition of this book, the authors continue their practice of explaining and illustrating the law of evidence.

Analysing the law of evidence, this book includes essential doctrinal analysis. It takes an account of evidence theory, psychological research on information processing and retrieval, socio-legal work on police investigations, and jury research projects. It reviews changes to the law, brought about by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Paciocco and Stuesser s "Law of Evidence," now in its 5th edition, is the most versatile text available on the Canadian law of evidence. The text has been cited and relied upon hundreds of times by courts of all levels across Canada, in both civil and criminal cases. It has also been adapted by the National Judicial Institute for their electronic bench book for trial judges. The new fifth edition carries on the practice in earlier editions of using new appellate level authorities to illustrate the law. It also chronicles significant changes in the law of self-incrimination and hearsay, as well as providing a concise and organized guide for dealing with section 24(2) exclusionary applications in the "Grant" era.

"This practice-oriented sourcebook, authored by a seasoned lawyer with the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General and a Master of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, contains a comprehensive digest of Canadian evidence law. The book covers the law of evidence as applied in both civil and criminal proceedings, and captures general evidentiary principles contained in thousands of selected excerpts from case law and statutes, supplemented with authoritative commentary. By providing the key passages of actual cases and statutes (as opposed to a discussion of theory), this book serves as a practical research tool for students, litigators and adjudicators alike, well suited to the preparation of an opinion, argument or factum."--pub. desc.

The Law of Evidence in Ireland explores the development of a particular Irish dimension to evidence scholarship, grounded in the constitutional concept of fairness and influenced by the case law of the ECHR. The phenomenon and impact of the non jury Special Criminal Court are considered, as are legislative changes targeting organised crime and sexual offences, as well as developments facilitating forensic testing as part of criminal investigation and evidence, under the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA Database System) Act 2014. Now in its fourth edition, this text has been updated with new sections including: - A look at judicial consideration of fairness in the pre-trial process in light of a changing societal context and delivery on the accused's right to fair trial, as reflected in analysis of Supreme Court decisions such as JC and Dwyer - The developing concept of transnational fairness in facing the challenge of cooperation in combating crime and instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant reflected in cases such as Celmer - The changing approach of Irish courts to traditional rules including those relating to expert witness testimony, evidence of bad character and prior misconduct, as well as assertions of new headings of privilege The text is of interest to all those working in the Irish legal system, the criminal legal system in particular, as well as to policy makers and those studying more general issues related to matters of trial, adjudication and fact-finding in various contexts.

Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.

This book examines systematically the underlying theory of evidence in Anglo-American legal systems and identifies the defining characteristics of adjudicative fact-finding. Stein develops a detailed innovative theory which sets aside the traditional vision of evidence law as facilitating the discovery of the truth. Combining probability theory, epistemology, economic analysis, and moral philosophy; he argues instead that the fundamental purpose of evidence law is to apportion the risk oferror in conditions of uncertainty. Stein begins by identifying the domain of evidence law.He then describes the basic traits of adjudicative fact-finding and explores the epistemological foundations of the concept. This discussion identifies the problem of probabilistic deduction that accompanies generalizations to which fact-finders resort. This problem engenders paradoxes which Stein proposes to resolve by distinguishing between probability and weight. Stein advances the principle of maximal individualization that does not allow factfinders to make a finding against a person when the evidence they use is not susceptible to individualized testing.He argues that this principle has broad application, but may still be overridden by social utility. This analysis identifies allocation of the risk of error as requiring regulation by evidence law. Advocating a principled allocation of the risk of error, Stein denounces free proof for allowing individual judges to apportion this risk asthey deem fit.He criticizes the UK's recent shift to a discretionary regime on similar grounds. Stein develops three fundamental principles for allocating the risk of error: the cost-efficiency principle which applies across the board; the equality principle which applies in civil litigation; and the equal best principle which applies in criminal trials. The cost-efficiency principle demands that fact-finders minimize the total cost of errors and error-avoidance.Under the equality principle,fact-finding procedures and decisions must not produce an unequal apportionment of the risk of error between the claimant and the defendant. This risk should be apportioned equally between the parties. The equal best principle sets forth two conditions for justifiably convicting and punishing a defendant. The state must do its best to protect the defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction and must not provide better protection to other individuals. Regulating both the admissibility of evidence and its sufficiency, these principles explain and justify many existing evidentiary rules. Alex Stein is Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.Cardozo School of Law,New York.