The Nato Russia Partnership

Four years after the NATO-Russia Council came into being, it represents a picture in ambivalence and incomplete realization of partnership. This monograph focuses on the Russian side of this growing estrangement. It finds the Russian roots of this ambivalence or alienation in the increasingly visible manifestations of an autocratic and neo-imperial Russian state and foreign and defense policy. These strong trends in Russian policy inhibit the formation of a genuine security partnership that can provide for Eurasian security in the face of multiple contemporary threats. Indeed, it is debatable whether Russia really wants a comprehensive partnership with NATO. The author examines Russia's perspectives in this relationship and this growing estrangement between the West and Russia, tracing it to trends in Russian domestic, defense, and foreign policies.

This is the first comprehensive analysis of the development of relations between Russia and NATO since 1991. Since the re-emergence of Russia as an independent state in December 1991, debates and controversies surrounding its evolving relations with NATO have been a prominent feature of the European security scene. This is the first detailed and comprehensive book-length analysis of Russia-NATO relations, covering the years 1991-2005. This new volume investigates the nature and substance of the ‘partnership’ relations that have developed between Russia and NATO since the end of the Cold War. It looks at the impact that the Kosovo crisis, September 11th, the Iraq War and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council have on this complex relationship. The author concludes that Russia and NATO have, so far, developed a pragmatic partnership, but one that may potentially develop into a more significant strategic partnership. This book will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, European politics and European security.

In May 1997, NATO concluded a Founding Act with the Russian Federation. Then, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO and the Russian Federation agreed to create a NATO-Russia Council (NRC), "where NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest." This report does not review in detail the record of the NATO-Russia Council. Rather, it points to some additional areas in which the members of the NATO-Russia Working Group believe the NRC can usefully become engaged. Whether the time has arrived for redefining Russia's relations with NATO-or within NATO is the key point of this report. This matter has two dimensions: the fulfillment of a 20th-century security agenda to ensure that the last century's European tragedy will "never again" be visited and a new agenda for the 21st century, typified by three concerns: terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and security for the broader Middle East. These two agendas include * Russia's greater and more-integrated participation in security, political, economic, and other arrangements for the great ongoing experiment in determining future security in Europe and beyond * Russia's role in the development of Western policy and practice in areas beyond Europe, especially in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus. In short, the next phase of NATO-Russia relations should focus on Russia's greater engagement as a partner and a participant.

Relations between the Russian Federation and the West have evolved steadily since the end of the Cold War. In late 2001, RAND and the Moscow-based Institute for the USA and Canada Studies created a working group that examined ways to increase cooperation between NATO and Russia. The group concluded that Russia should become more deeply involved, as an equal partner, in NATO deliberations, including in regard to the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The goal is to share responsibilities and build security across Eurasia.

Soon after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged Russian support to the U.S. campaign against terrorism. Putin's actions triggered a process that also led to a Russo-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rapprochement and Russian membership in a newly formed NATORussia Council created by the Treaty of Rome in 2002. However, since then this partnership has been a rocky and ambivalent one. And as East-West relations deteriorate, as they have over the last four years, the stresses in this partnership bid fair to outweigh the benefits to the players involved. Accordingly, this monograph focuses on the Russian side of this relationship and seeks to uncover, as well as analyze, the reasons for Russia's growing ambivalence toward NATO and the growing sense of estrangement between these two key actors in Eurasian security. Professor Stephen J. Blank's monograph grew out of a paper prepared for a 2005 Paris conference of Franco-American diplomats.

Four years after the NATO-Russia Council came into being, it represents a picture in ambivalence and incomplete realization of partnership. This monograph focuses on the Russian side of this growing estrangement. It finds the Russian roots of this ambivalence or alienation in the increasingly visible manifestations of an autocratic and neo-imperial Russian state and foreign and defense policy. These strong trends in Russian policy inhibit the formation of a genuine security partnership that can provide for Eurasian security in the face of multiple contemporary threats. Indeed, it is debatable whether Russia really wants a comprehensive partnership with NATO. The author examines Russia's perspectives in this relationship and this growing estrangement between the West and Russia, tracing it to trends in Russian domestic, defense, and foreign policie.

"NATO and Russia are developing a new relationship as a critical part of integrating Russia into the West. The allies and Russia will meet together as equals in a NATO-Russia Council-to consult, cooperate, and, in some critical areas, decide on common action. The authors of this report, with a wealth of academic and senior government experience in the United States and Russia, argue that action-what NATO and Russia actually do together-is more important than "architecture," that is, how the new Council is constructed and operates. Despite continuing differences (e.g., on NATO enlargement) the authors argue that NATO-Russian relations can and should be organized to promote greater stability, take into account other European states' interests, promote joint decisionmaking, and pursue a practical agenda of common tasks both in Europe and beyond. NATO and Russia should immediately begin modest "demonstration projects," using early successes to promote future cooperation. Efforts should be in areas where NATO and Russia have shared interests, including aspects of counterterrorism, emergency response, nonproliferation, peacekeeping (including doctrine and exercises), and military exchanges."--Rand abstracts.