The Political Economy Of The European Constitution

The enlargement process, the creation of the Monetary Union and the need to promote further the political and economic integration of Europe have ignited an intense debate at the European level among researchers and policy-makers. Examining the effects that political, legal, and regulatory institutions have on economic development, this book provides new contributions on the political economy of the European constitution. It covers many issues including social protection, fiscal reform and regional policies that are on the table of European policy makers. Furthermore, it provides ideas and analysis of such issues as the problem of voting reform, the centralization and decentralization of the policy process and the allocation of new policy prerogatives at the EU level which are crucial for the design of a new European constitution.

This text contributes to the debate on Europe's future, taking a political economy approach to analysing some of the underlying issues. It argues that collective action problems require a courageous step forward in creating coherent governance structures for the Union and that it has become essential to give European citizens their democratic right to political automony, taking the European common concern out of the sole hands of national governments. Topics include: the essence of European integration; the changing context of European unification; collective action and economic federalism; and implications for a European Constitution.

This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy and suggests possible future strategies for change.

This book seeks to analyse the development of the European Union (EU), which was founded upon the principle of the free movement of capital, goods, services and people in 1957. Its central thesis is that, from a practical and theoretical point of view, such a basis is fundamentally at odds with the creation of an interventionist regime that the construction of a social Europe would require. The authors argue convincingly that - economically: the EU does not currently possess the budget or the economic tools to pursue such a strategy; politically: close to none of the institutions of the EU have backed such a policy; practically: conservative and neo-liberal forces (among member states and the institutions of the EU) have repeatedly thwarted any moves in this direction. In reality, the Single Internal Market, Economic and Monetary Union, enlargement, the Lisbon Agenda and European Constitution projects all prioritise supply-side measures and expanding the scope of the market rather than the boosting of demand and other economic intervention. Consequently, constructing a social Europe in the face of this would appear problematic. Hence, in both theory and practice, the idea that there can be a social Europe vis-à-vis neoliberalisation is a contradiction in terms. This controversial book will be an educating and refreshing read for advanced students and academics involved with European politics, the European Union, European Economics and Economic instititutions.

At head of title: Progress Foundation. Includes bibliographical references (p. 279-280).

Annotation. The European Constitutional Convention offers a historical opportunity to rethink and to improve the governance and organization of the European Union. At stake is Europe's political architecture: the form that government takes and the allocation of responsibilities between the member states and supranational bodies. Many reform proposals have already been offered to the Convention. This Report provides a method for evaluating those options, developing an analytical framework derived from recent developments in the theory of positive political economy. On this basis the authors conclude that a presidential system of governance is likely to be best adapted to Europe -- and specifically to the need to expand the competency of the EU in the areas of internal and external security (Europe's Second and Third Pillars). In a full-blown presidential system, the Commission would have well-defined executive powers, specified by the Council, and a president elected by the citizens of Europe. The European executive would be subject to checks and balances by both the Council and the European Parliament. But political realism excludes adopting such a solution in the short run. The authors therefore propose an evolutionary strategy: the election of the Commission president by a college of country representatives appointed in the short run by national parliaments, leaving the option open to individual countries to allocate their votes for the presidency via universal suffrage. This solution would preserve the option of moving to a fully-fledged presidential model sometime in the future, while providing enhanced democratic legitimacy from the start. In general, the Constitution should be long on principles and general rules and short on details so as to allow Europe's governance to evolve within an unchanged Constitution. Book jacket.

The Politics and Economics of Power looks at the emerging interface between economics and politics. The analysis of power relations - traditionally the preserve of political science - is increasingly being adopted by economists in order to aid understanding of concepts such as the 'contested nature' of market exchanges. The papers examine power relations in the firm and market-place, and offer an economic perspective on power relations.

This book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change. The authors argue that a fiscal constitution is essential to help solve the deficits and debts that member countries face due to welfare state financing. Moreover, they believe that the successful implementation of a fiscal constitution is the key to a more coherent institutional setting for Europe as a whole. Although monetary institutions within the EU have already secured a degree of constitutional solution in the form of the euro, they warn that its stabilising power should not be overestimated: the European Central Bank has yet to experience financial crises like those faced by the Federal Reserve Bank. The authors move on to propose a new parliamentary design for Europe and assess the advantages for the elite of a small country to join the EU, compared to the population at large. This volume comprehensively explores the rapidly changing institutional configuration of the EU, employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It will be required reading for scholars of public choice, and those with an interest in political economy and EU integration. It is also an excellent sourcebook on European institutions and would provide useful complementary reading in a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses.