The Red River Campaign Of 1864 And The Loss By The Confederacy Of The Civil War

The Union Army’s Red River Campaign began on March 12, 1864, with a two-pronged attack aimed at gaining control of Shreveport, Louisiana. It lasted until May 22, 1864, when, after suffering significant casualties, the Union army retreated to Simmesport, Louisiana. The campaign was an attempt to prevent Confederate alliance with the French in Mexico, deny supplies to Confederate forces, and secure vast quantities of Louisiana and Texas cotton for Northern mills. With this examination of Confederate leadership and how it affected the Red River Campaign, the author argues against the standard assumption that the campaign had no major effect on the outcome of the war. In fact, the South had—and lost—an excellent opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat that might have changed the course of history. With this campaign as an ideal example, the politics of military decision-making in general are also analyzed.

The Red River Campaign in the spring of 1864 was one of the most destructive of the Civil War. The agricultural wealth of the Red River Valley tempted Union General Nathaniel P. Banks to invade with 30,000 troops in an attempt to seize control of the river and confiscate as much cotton as possible from local plantations. After three months of chaos, during which the countryside was destroyed and many slaves freed themselves, Banks was defeated by a smaller Confederate force under General Richard Taylor. This book takes a fresh look at the fierce battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, the Union army's escape from Monett's Ferry and the burning of Alexandria, and explains the causes and consequences of the war in Central Louisiana.

Taking its title from General William Tecumseh Sherman's blunt description, this book is a fresh inspection of what was the Civil War's largest operation between the Union Army and Navy west of the Mississippi River. Maps & photos.

Originally published in 1958. Johnson tells the story of the Red River Campaign, which took place in Louisiana and Arkansas in the spring of 1864. In response to the demands of Union Free-Soil interests in Texas, and the need of New England textile manufacturers for cotton, an expedition was undertaken to open the way to Texas. General Nathaniel Banks conducted a combined military and naval expedition up the Red River in a campaign that lasted only from March 23 to May 20, 1864, but was one of the most destructive of the Civil War. The campaign ended in Banks's defeat at the Battle of Sabine Crossroads. This book illustrates how military operations during the Civil War were often intimately interwoven with political, economic, and ideological factors, which frequently determined the time and place of a Union offensive. The author describes the desires and opinions of the public, the press, and Lincoln's administration regarding an invasion of Texas, as well as the motivation of the officers themselves, such as Banks's aspiration for the 1864 presidential nomination. Johnson relates vividly the various battles of the expedition and the problems posed by mustering undisciplined troops, by having to procure supplies in poor country with insufficient supply lines, and by contending with bad weather and rough terrain.

Through the Howling Wilderness is replete with in-depth coverage on the geography of the region, the Congressional hearings after the Campaign, and the Confederate defenses in the Red River Valley.

An Alternate Selection of the History Book Clubi One of the most shocking and humiliating defeats in the United States' military history, the Red River Campaign narrowly missed turning the tide of the entire Civil War. The daring military operation took place in north Louisiana, in April of 1864. Though the Union soldiers outnumbered the Confederates nearly four to one, the Union forces found themselves under assault and running for their lives. Written in an engaging tone, this illustrated volume chronicles the campaign in precise detail.This accessible book begins with an overview of the campaign, emphasizing the impact that it had on the outcome of the Civil War. Successive sections cover Confederate Richard Taylor's strategy, the initial assault of the Union Army of the Gulf, the Confederate's surprise retaliation attack at Mansfield, and the Southerner's pursuit of the fleeing Yankees. The final chapter discusses alternative strategies that may have led to a Confederate victory, along with the subsequent careers of major participants.

The Confederacy had a great opportunity to turn the Civil War in its favor in 1864, but squandered this chance when it failed to finish off a Union army cornered in Louisiana because of concerns about another Union army coming south from Arkansas. The Confederates were so confused that they could not agree on a course of action to contend with both threats, thus the Union offensive advancing from Arkansas saved the one in Louisiana and became known to history as the Camden Expedition. The Camden Expedition is intriguing because of the “might-have-beens” had the key players made different decisions. The author contends that if Frederick Steele, commander of the Federal VII Army Corps, had not received a direct order from General Ulysses S. Grant to move south, disaster would have befallen not only the Army of the Gulf in Louisiana but the entire Union cause, and possibly would have prevented Abraham Lincoln from winning reelection.

William Royston Geise was a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Texas at Austin in the early 1970s when he researched and wrote The Confederate Military Forces in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1861- 1865: A Study in Command in 1974. Although it remained unpublished, it was not wholly unknown. Deep-diving researchers were aware of Dr. Geise’s work and lamented the fact that it was not widely available to the general public. In many respects, studies of the Trans-Mississippi Theater are only now catching up with Geise. This intriguing book traces the evolution of Confederate command and how it affected the shifting strategic situation and general course of the war. Dr. Geise accomplishes his task by coming at the question in a unique fashion. Military field operations are discussed as needed, but his emphasis is on the functioning of headquarters and staff—the central nervous system of any military command. This was especially so for the Trans-Mississippi. After July 1863, the only viable Confederate agency west of the great river was the headquarters at Shreveport. That hub of activity became the sole location to which all isolated players, civilians and military alike, could look for immediate overall leadership and a sense of Confederate solidarity. By filling these needs, the Trans-Mississippi Department assumed a unique and vital role among Confederate military departments and provided a focus for continued Confederate resistance west of the Mississippi River. The author’s work mining primary archival sources and published firsthand accounts, coupled with a smooth and clear writing style, helps explain why this remote department (referred to as “Kirby Smithdom” after Gen. Kirby Smith) failed to function efficiently, and how and why the war unfolded there as it did. Trans-Mississippi Theater historian and Ph.D. candidate Michael J. Forsyth (Col., U.S. Army, Ret.) has resurrected Dr. Geise’s smoothly written and deeply researched manuscript from its undeserved obscurity. This edition, with its original annotations and Forsyth’s updated citations and observations, is bolstered with original maps, photographs, and images. Students of the war in general, and the Trans-Mississippi Theater in particular, will delight in its long overdue publication.