The Stab In The Back Myth And The Fall Of The Weimar Republic

This unique sourcebook explores the Stab-in-the-Back myth that developed in Germany in the wake of World War One, analyzing its role in the end of the Weimar Republic and its impact on the Nazi regime that followed. A critical development in modern German and even European history that has received relatively little coverage until now, the Stab-in-the-Back Myth was an attempt by the German military, nationalists and anti-Semites to explain how the German war effort collapsed in November 1918 along with the German Empire. It purported that the German army did not lose the First World War but were betrayed by the civilians on the home front and the democratic politicians who had surrendered. The myth was one of the foundation myths of National Socialism, at times influencing Nazi behaviour in the 1930s and later their conduct in the Second World War. The Stab-in-the-Back Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic draws on German government records, foreign and domestic newspaper accounts, diplomatic reports, diary entries and letters to provide different national and political perspectives on the issue. The sourcebook also includes chapter summaries, study questions, and further reading lists, in addition to numerous visual sources and a range of maps, charts, tables and graphs. This is a vital text for all students looking at the history of the Weimar Republic, the legacy of the First World War and Germany in the 20th century.

A groundbreaking reassessment of the crucial but unrecognized roles Germany's Jews played at home and at the front during World War I

They are two of twentieth-century history’s most significant figures, yet today they are largely forgotten – Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, Germany’s First World War leaders. Although defeat in 1918 brought an end to their ‘silent dictatorship’, both generals played a key role in the turbulent politics of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazis. Alexander Clifford, in this perceptive reassessment of their political careers, questions the popular image of these generals in the English-speaking world as honourable ‘Good Germans’. For they were intensely political men, whose ideas and actions shaped the new Germany and ultimately led to Hitler’s dictatorship. Their poisonous wartime legacy was the infamous stab-in-the-back myth. According to the generals, the true cause of the disastrous defeat in the First World War was the betrayal of the army by politicians, leftists and Jews on the home front. This toxic conspiracy theory polluted Weimar politics and has been labelled the beginning of ‘the twisted road to Auschwitz’. Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s political fortunes after the war were markedly different. Ludendorff inhabited the far-right fringes and engaged in plots, assassinations and conspiracies, playing a leading role in failed uprisings such as Hitler’s 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Meanwhile Hindenburg was a vastly more successful politician, winning two presidential elections and serving as head of state for nine years. Arguably he bore even more responsibility for the destruction of democracy, for he and the nationalist right he led sought, through Hitler, to remould the Weimar system towards authoritarianism.

A riveting account of how the Nazi Party came to power and how the failures of the Weimar Republic and the shortsightedness of German politicians allowed it to happen. Why did democracy fall apart so quickly and completely in Germany in the 1930s? How did a democratic government allow Adolf Hitler to seize power? In The Death of Democracy, Benjamin Carter Hett answers these questions, and the story he tells has disturbing resonances for our own time. To say that Hitler was elected is too simple. He would never have come to power if Germany’s leading politicians had not responded to a spate of populist insurgencies by trying to co-opt him, a strategy that backed them into a corner from which the only way out was to bring the Nazis in. Hett lays bare the misguided confidence of conservative politicians who believed that Hitler and his followers would willingly support them, not recognizing that their efforts to use the Nazis actually played into Hitler’s hands. They had willingly given him the tools to turn Germany into a vicious dictatorship. Benjamin Carter Hett is a leading scholar of twentieth-century Germany and a gifted storyteller whose portraits of these feckless politicians show how fragile democracy can be when those in power do not respect it. He offers a powerful lesson for today, when democracy once again finds itself embattled and the siren song of strongmen sounds ever louder.

This text scrutinizes the motives, actions, and constraints that informed decision making by the various politicians who bore the principal responsibility for drafting the Treaty of Versailles.

During the last four decades the German Revolution 1918/19 has only attracted little scholarly attention. This volume offers new cultural historical perspectives, puts this revolution into a wider time frame (1916-23), and coheres around three interlinked propositions: (i) acknowledging that during its initial stage the German Revolution reflected an intense social and political challenge to state authority and its monopoly of physical violence, (ii) it was also replete with »Angst«-ridden wrangling over its longer-term meaning and direction, and (iii) was characterized by competing social movements that tried to cultivate citizenship in a new, unknown state.

Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis investigates the various political and cultural manifestations of the myth surrounding German Chief of Staff and Reich President Paul von Hindenburg, from the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914 to his death in the 'Third Reich' and beyond. How this little-known General, whose career to normal retirement age had provided no real foretaste of his heroic status, became a national icon and living myth, and what this phenomenon tells us about one of the most crucial periods in German history, is the subject of this book. The book charts the origins of the Hindenburg myth during the First World War, looks at how it survived the revolution, and explains why Hindenburg's name on the ballot mesmerized voters in the presidential elections of 1925 and 1932. The only two times in German history that the people could elect their head of state directly and secretly, they chose this national icon; Hindenburg even managed to defeat Hitler in 1932, making him the Nazi leader's ultimate arbiter. The book examines the complex role of the Hindenburg myth in fashioning the Führer cult, while also emphasizing its more wide-ranging appeal prior to 1933. The Hindenburg myth, in fact, caught the imagination of an exceptionally broad social and political coalition of Germans, turning it into one of the most potent forces in German politics in a period otherwise characterised by rupture and fragmentation. Crucially, it managed to survive military failures and political disappointments. As the author shows, the mythical narrative was constantly evolving, but the belief in Hindenburg's mythical qualities was more enduring than a narrow application of Weber's model of 'charismatic authority' -- which defines projection as key -- would suggest.