The Tank Killers

The Tank Killers is the story of the American Tank Destroyer Force in North Africa, Italy, and the European Theater during World War II. The tank destroyer (TD) was a bold-if some would say flawed-answer to the challenge posed by the seemingly unstoppable German blitzkrieg. The TD was conceived to be light and fast enough to outmaneuver panzer forces and go where tanks could not. At the same time, the TD would wield the firepower needed to kill any German tank on the battlefield. Indeed, American doctrine stipulated that TDs would fight tanks, while American tanks would concentrate on achieving and exploiting breakthroughs of enemy lines. The Tank Killers follows the men who fought in the TDs from the formation of the force in 1941 through the victory over the Third Reich in 1945. It is a story of American flexibility and pragmatism in military affairs. Tankdestroyers were among the very first units to land in North Africa in 1942. Their first vehicles were ad hoc affairs: Halftracks and weapons carriers with guns no better than those on tanks and thin armor affording the crews considerably less protection. Almost immediately, the crews realized that their doctrine was incomplete. They began adapting to circumstances, along with their partners in the infantry and armored divisions. By the time that North Africa was in Allied hands, the TD had become a valued tank fighter, assault gun, and artillery piece. The reconnaissance teams in TD battalions, meanwhile, had established a record for daring operations that they would continue for the rest of the war. The story continues with the invasion of Italy and finally that of Fortress Europe on 6 June 1944. By now, the brass had decreed that half the force would convert to towed guns, a decision that dogged the affected crews through the end of the war. The TD men encountered increasingly lethal enemies, ever more dangerous panzers that were often vulnerable only to their guns while American tank crews watched in frustration as their rounds bounced harmlessly off the thick German armor. They fought under incredibly diverse conditions that demanded constant modification of tactics. Their equipment became ever more deadly. By VE day, the tank destroyer battalions had achieved impressive records, generally with kill/loss rates heavily in their favor. Yet the Army after the war concluded that the concept of a separate TD arm was so fundamentally flawed that not a single battalion existed after November 1946. The Tank Killers draws heavily on the records of the tank destroyer battalions and the units with which they fought. Veterans of the force add their personal stories.

“A fantastic read . . . Whether your interest is armour or history I would highly recommend this book” (Military Modelling). The tank destroyer was a bold—though some would say flawed—answer to the challenge posed by the seemingly unstoppable German Blitzkrieg. The TD was conceived to be light and fast enough to outmaneuver panzer forces and go where tanks could not. At the same time, the TD would wield the firepower needed to kill any German tank on the battlefield. Indeed, American doctrine stipulated that TDs would fight tanks, while American tanks would concentrate on achieving and exploiting breakthroughs of enemy lines. The Tank Killers follows the men who fought in the TDs, from the formation of the force in 1941 through the victory over the Third Reich in 1945. It is a story of American flexibility and pragmatism in military affairs. Tank destroyers were among the very first units to land in North Africa in 1942. Their first vehicles were ad hoc affairs: halftracks and weapons carriers with guns no better than those on tanks, thin armor affording the crews considerably less protection. Almost immediately, the crews began adapting to circumstances, along with their partners in the infantry and armored divisions. By the time North Africa was in Allied hands, the TD had become a valued tank fighter, assault gun, and artillery piece. The reconnaissance teams in TD battalions, meanwhile, had established a record for daring operations that would continue for the rest of the war. The story continues with the invasion of Italy and, finally, that of Fortress Europe on June 6, 1944. By now, the brass had decreed that half the force would convert to towed guns, a decision that dogged the affected crews through the end of the war. The TD men encountered increasingly lethal enemies, ever more dangerous panzers that were often vulnerable only to their guns, while American tank crews watched in frustration as their rounds bounced harmlessly off the thick German armor. They fought under incredibly diverse conditions that demanded constant modification of tactics, and their equipment became ever more deadly. By VE-Day, the tank destroyer battalions had achieved impressive records, generally with kill-loss rates heavily in their favor. Yet the army after the war concluded that the concept of a separate TD arm was so fundamentally flawed that not a single battalion existed after November 1946. The Tank Killers draws heavily on the records of the tank destroyer battalions and the units with which they fought, as well as personal stories from veterans of the force.

Sturmgeschtz III was originally designed as an assault weapon, but as war progressed it was increasingly used in a defensive role and evolved into an assault gun and tank destroyer. By 1943 its main role was providing anti-tank support to the units in its area of operation. This consequently led to many StuGs being destroyed in battle. Nonetheless they were very successful as tank killers and destroyed, among others, many bunkers, pillboxes and other defenses. While not considered to be a true tank because it lacked a turret, the gun was mounded directly in the hull, with a low profile to reduce vehicle heights, and had a limited lateral traverse of a few degrees in either direction. Thus, the entire vehicle had to be turned in order to acquire targets. Omitting the turret made production much simpler and less costly, enabling greater numbers to be built. Most assault guns were mounted on the chassis of a Panzer III or Panzer IV, with the resultant model being called either a StuG III or StuG IV respectively. The StuG was one of the most effective tracked vehicles of World War II, and over 10,000 of them were eventually produced.

This comprehensive and superbly illustrated book describes in authoritative detail the characteristics and contribution to victory of these formidable American fighting vehicles. Only after the Nazis invaded Poland and France did the United States Government authorize mass production of tanks. By the end of the War American industry had built nearly 90,000 tanks, more than Germany and Great Britain combined. The first big order in May 1940 was for 365 M2A4 light tanks, the initial iteration of the Stuart series, with almost 24,000 constructed. The Stuart series was supplemented by almost 5,000 units of the M24 Chaffee light tank. There was also the failed M22 Locust light tank intended for airborne operations. The M4 series of medium tanks, best known as the Sherman, were the most numerous with some 50,000 in service with not only the American military but British and other Allied armies. It was not until later in the war that the M26 Pershing heavy tank was built. Initially the US Army doctrine saw tanks as primarily for the exploitation role. Later the concept of tank destroyers evolved to counter large scale German armored offensives. These defensive AFVs included the half-track-based 75mm Gun Motor Carriage M3 and the full-tracked M10, M18, and M36. This comprehensive and superbly illustrated book describes in authoritative detail the characteristics and contribution to victory of these formidable fighting vehicles.

"Toward the end of World War II, newspapers revealed what American soldiers had discovered months before - when Sherman tanks tried to slug it out with the heavier German Panzers, they came out second best. Historical argument has it that the hidebound conservatives of the Army effectively blocked the introduction of superior fighting vehicles based on their tactical dogmas that tank destroyers - not tanks - should fight German armor. "Faint Praise" disagrees with this notion, and instead reveals that problems in tank development resulted from a complicated and often confusing melange of technology, doctrine, combat experience, intelligence, and personalities. Further, it dispels the myth that soldiers were pleading for a better armed Sherman throughout the war. The demand for big guns did not start until mid-1944, leaving little time for a technological solution to Panzer-killing. Using new, fascinating sources and a fresh look at some old ones, "Faint Praise" considers the full spectrum of historically relevent facts, from technological capabilities to operational history, to provide a new answer to the tank question of World War II."

A general-turned-historian reveals the remarkable battlefield heroics of Major General Maurice Rose, the World War II tank commander whose 3rd Armored Division struck fear into the hearts of Hitler's panzer crews. “The Panzer Killers is a great book, vividly written and shrewdly observed.”—The Wall Street Journal Two months after D-Day, the Allies found themselves in a stalemate in Normandy, having suffered enormous casualties attempting to push through hedgerow country. Troops were spent, and American tankers, lacking the tactics and leadership to deal with the terrain, were losing their spirit. General George Patton and the other top U.S. commanders needed an officer who knew how to break the impasse and roll over the Germans—they needed one man with the grit and the vision to take the war all the way to the Rhine. Patton and his peers selected Maurice Rose. The son of a rabbi, Rose never discussed his Jewish heritage. But his ferocity on the battlefield reflected an inner flame. He led his 3rd Armored Division not from a command post but from the first vehicle in formation, charging headfirst into a fight. He devised innovative tactics, made the most of American weapons, and personally chose the cadre of young officers who drove his division forward. From Normandy to the West Wall, from the Battle of the Bulge to the final charge across Germany, Maurice Rose's deadly division of tanks blasted through enemy lines and pursued the enemy with a remarkable intensity. In The Panzer Killers, Daniel P. Bolger, a retired lieutenant general and Iraq War veteran, offers up a lively, dramatic tale of Rose's heroism. Along the way, Bolger infuses the narrative with fascinating insights that could only come from an author who has commanded tank forces in combat. The result is a unique and masterful story of battlefield leadership, destined to become a classic.

After the collapse of the French army in 1940, the U.S. Army quickly moved to develop a doctrine, organization, and weaponry to deal with a large-scale mechanized attack such as the German Blitzkrieg. The result was the development of a "tank destroyer" concept that combined an aggressive doctrine, an elite spirit, and highly mobile, heavily gunned weapons - and which proved to be seriously flawed in practice. "Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II" provides a case study of how General Lesley J. McNair, at the direction of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, developed the tank destroyer doctrine and its resultant antitank quasi-arm, and how the program's flawed once it was implemented. Even aside from the failure of the Germans to use massed armor in the latter part of the war, the rapid evolution of armor technology as the war went on, and the piecemeal use of tank destroyer battalions by field commanders, "Seek, Strike, and Destroy" shows that, given the largely offensive nature of the Army's mission, an strong anti-tank program assumed a defensive strategy which, if implemented, conceded that mission's failure. The misunderstanding of the mission, threat, and technology, combined with branch rivalries and obstruction within the Army, produced a tank destroyer hamstrung by tactical misuse and a technology woefully inadequate in the face of rapidly improving German armor technology. "Seek, Strike, and Destroy" not only explains the failure of a particular doctrine, but illuminates the more general problem of doctrinal development based on an inadequate understanding of technical and strategic realities. Strategists and scholars alike will find much to ponder in this valuable book. Originally published in 1985: 100 p. ill.