There Are Such Things

While the Weem Witch was going to print, Lenny would take lectures about the pittenweem Witches inside the medieval tower where it all took place. During a tour, 16 people witnessed an apparition, it stood in view and was photographed by one of the party, 8 years later of study, "there are such things" is written documenting poltergeist activity, and written by those who have witnessed the "thing" photographs inside give it credibility with newspaper accounts and TV coverage adds to a strange tale. The tower has stood for 400 years, whatever walks the tower floors, walks alone.

There Are No Such Things as Theories considers the fundamental question: what is a scientific theory? It presents a range of options - from theories are sets of propositions, to theories are families of models, abstract artefacts, or fictions - and highlights the various problems they all face. In so doing it draws multiple comparisons between theories and artworks: on the one hand, theories are like certain kinds of paintings with regard to their representational capacity; on the other, they are like musical works in that they can be multiply presented. An alternative answer to the question is then offered, drawing on the metaphysics of musical works: there are no such things as theories. Nevertheless, we can still talk about them, since that talk is made true by the various practices that scientists engage in. The implications of this form of eliminativism for the realism debate is then discussed and it is concluded that this may offer a more flexible framework in which we can understand both the history and the philosophy of science in general.

There Are No Such Things as Theories considers the fundamental question: what is a scientific theory? It presents a range of options - from theories are sets of propositions, to theories are families of models, abstract artefacts, or fictions - and highlights the various problems they all face. In so doing it draws multiple comparisons between theories and artworks: on the one hand, theories are like certain kinds of paintings with regard to their representational capacity; on the other, they are like musical works in that they can be multiply presented. An alternative answer to the question is then offered, drawing on the metaphysics of musical works: there are no such things as theories. Nevertheless, we can still talk about them, since that talk is made true by the various practices that scientists engage in. The implications of this form of eliminativism for the realism debate is then discussed and it is concluded that this may offer a more flexible framework in which we can understand both the history and the philosophy of science in general.

In the last five decades, ethical theory has been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts-that reasons in that sense come first. Reasons First systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology: about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. Schroeder shows that, along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge.

... dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed.

Are moral standards relative? Are there moral facts? What is goodness? If there moral facts are how do we learn about them? These are all questions about metaethics, the branch of ethics that studies ethical properties, statements, attitudes and judgements. To the uninitiated it can appear abstract and far removed from its two more brash cousins, ethical theory and applied ethics, yet it is one of the fastest-growing and most exciting areas of ethics. What is this thing called Metaethics? demystifies this important subject and is ideal for students coming to it for the first time. Beginning with a brief historical overview of metaethics Matthew Chrisman introduces and assesses the following key topics: moral reality: including questions about naturalism and non-naturalism, moral facts, and the distinction between realism and antirealism; moral language: does language represent reality? What mental states are expressed by moral statements? moral psychology: Hume's theory of motivation and the connection between moral judgement and motivation; moral knowledge: including moral disagreement, the distinction between internalist and externalist theories of knowledge, and theories of objectivity and relativism in metaethics; nonnaturalism; expressivism; error-theory; naturalism; contemporary theories and arguments in metaethics, including Derek Parfit, Simon Blackburn, John McDowell, Christine Korsgaard and Alan Gibbard; new directions in metaethics, such as 'metaepistemology' and 'metanormative theory'.

In this bold and original book, the author develops a provocative theory about the metaphysics of material objects. According to this view, visible inanimate objects such as ships or mountains or stars do not, strictly speaking, exist.