Corporate Governance And Securities Regulation In The 21st Century

"This book is a compilation of essays written by lawyers who were enrolled in a corporate governance seminar in 2002 as a part of the Part-Time Master of Laws program in Securities Law at Osgoode Hall Law School. The contributors include securities lawyers at major Canadian law firms, provincial securities commissions, self-regulatory organizations and corporations. An essay was also contributed by two professors at Osgoode Hall Law School. Each chapter represents a critical aspect of securities law and corporate governance reform, looking at how legal and market mechanisms aim to encourage better corporate governance monitoring."--Pub. desc.

At the end of the twentieth century it was thought by many that the Anglo-American system of corporate governance was performing effectively and some observers claimed to see an international trend towards convergence around this model. There can be no denying that the recent corporate governance crisis in the US has caused many to question their faith in this view. This collection of essays provides a comprehensive attempt to answer the following questions: firstly, what went wrong - when and why do markets misprice the value of firms, and what was wrong with the incentives set by Enron? Secondly, what has been done in response, and how well will it work - including essays on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, UK company law reform and European company law and auditor liability reform, along with a consideration of corporate governance reforms in historical perspective. Three approaches emerge. The first two share the premise that the system is fundamentally sound, but part ways over whether a regulatory response is required. The third view, in contrast, argues that the various scandals demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in the Anglo-American system itself, which cannot hope to be repaired by the sort of reforms that have taken place. "This collection of papers by leading US and European corporate law scholars provides fresh and rigorous analyses of the recent corporate governance scandals and the strategies devised by regulators to guard against future governance failures." Randall Thomas, John Beasley Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Vanderbilt University.

At the end of the twentieth century, it was thought by many that the Anglo-American system of corporate governance was performing effectively and some observers claimed to see an international trend towards convergence around this model. There can be no denying that the recent corporate governance crisis in the US has caused many to question their faith in this view. This collection of essays provides a comprehensive attempt to answer the following questions: first, what went wrong - when and why do markets misprice the value of firms, and what was wrong with the incentives set by Enron? Secondly, what has been done in response, and how well will it work - including essays on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, UK company law reform and European company law and auditor liability reform, along with a consideration of corporate governance reforms in historical perspective. Three approaches emerge. The first two share the premise that the system is fundamentally sound, but part ways over whether a regulatory response is required. The third view, in contrast, argues that the various scandals demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in the Anglo-American system itself, which cannot hope to be repaired by the sort of reforms that have taken place.[This essay is the introductory chapter to J. Armour and J.A. McCahery (eds.), After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, forthcoming 2006 (Oxford: Hart Publishing)].

Global capital markets are in a state of flux. Castigated in the past as OC Barbarians at the GateOCO, private equity providers are once again proclaiming the end of the public corporation. This important book addresses the implications of private equity for the governance of corporations, the capital markets in which they operate and the professionals who provide corporate advisory services. The book evaluates and ranks the precise nature of the risk posed by private equity by situating it within an overarching analysis of the dynamics of financial capitalism. Key issues addressed include: the management of conflicts of interest, fiduciary duties, the role of enforcement, the efficacy of adopting a rules- or principles-based system of regulation, the form and function of compliance, and a detailed examination of how to embed accountability into an integrity system for the financial markets. The book therefore has enormous benefit for industry, regulatory and academic communities alike. Sample Chapter(s). Introduction: The Dynamics of Capital Market Governance (157 KB). Chapter 1: The Conceptual Underpinnings of Australian Securities Regulation (116 KB). Contents: Introduction: The Dynamics of Capital Market Governance (J O''Brien); The Conceptual Underpinnings of Australian Securities Regulation (M Rodgers); Evolving OCyRules of the GameOCO in Corporate Governance Reform (J Hill); Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of Law (L B Edelman); The Significance of Relative Autonomy in How Regulation of the Financial Services Sector Evolves (G Gilligan); ASIC v Citigroup: Investment Banks, Conflicts of Interest, and Chinese Walls (P F Hanrahan); Enforcement of Capital Markets Regulation: The United Kingdom and Its International Markets (I MacNeil); Why Auditors Don''t Find Fraud (N M Hodson); Compliance, Ethics and Responsibility: Emergent Governance Strategies in the US and UK (D McBarnet); Professional Norms (D Cocking); Sarbanes-Oxley and the Search for Accountable Corporate Governance (M J Dubnick); Charting an Icarian Flightpath: The Implications of the Qantas Deal Collapse (J O''Brien); Institutions, Integrity Systems and Market Actors (S Miller). Readership: Postgraduate law and business students; also suitable for general informed market (e.g. investment bankers, compliance professionals, providers of corporate advisory services including lawyers, tax advisors and auditors).

Corporate Governance and Finance Law is designed to educate students, researchers, and practitioners on the legal aspects of corporate financial markets within the United States, the Eurozone, and China.

Why U.S. corporate governance regulation has lost its way, and what must be done to improve it Modern history persuasively demonstrates the inexorable link that binds comprehensive regulation to the global economy. This important book, rather than simply recount a litany of corporate governance failures, persuasively explains why, despite policymakers' best intentions, regulation has failed in the modern era. An objective study intended for a diverse readership, Corporate Governance Regulation unveils the underlying, root causes of regulatory failure. The result: A compelling and original analysis, broadly suited for a global audience of all backgrounds. Written by published, subject-area experts, the authors carefully delineate how U.S. corporate governance regulation, beginning with Sarbanes Oxley, lacks an adequate rational basis, as may be attributed to a non-existent policy dialogue The witnessed result: A conspicuous lack of regulatory efficacy, enormous costs, coupled with paltry benefits The focus is upon reigniting a stalled, non-productive policy dialogue, by eschewing stale, overly-polemicized arguments, as needed to develop a common ground Drawing from an eclectic, analytic framework, governance experts Nicholas Vakkur and Zulma Herrera offer both the professional and global citizen alike a multi-dimensional understanding of issues critical to global economic health. Nuanced and persuasively argued, Corporate Governance Regulation represents a formidable catalyst in the elusive, ongoing quest for global economic stability.

How effectively can governing mechanisms forged before the surge of activist investment continue to protect shareholders and efficiently order capital markets? This is a pressing question for scholars and practitioners of corporate law, as well as for market participants generally. In order to illuminate the extent to which the growing trend of shareholder activism calls for a new understanding of the kind of shareholder-corporate relations the law should facilitate, this book introduces the concept of shareholder-driven corporate governance. This concept refers to the evident phenomenon of shareholder involvement in corporate governance and offers a normative endorsement of this development. In order to secure the benefits of investors' increasing involvement in corporate affairs, regulatory regimes must grapple with a number of considerations. This book is based on the idea that shareholder corporate governance is a welcome development, but that it does not come without regulatory challenges. For one, it requires rejecting the idea that well-ordered capital markets can be achieved through corporate law which is subservient to private ordering. The mandatory character of, for example, securities regulation is vital to fostering shareholder involvement in corporate affairs. Defenders of shareholder corporate governance must also confront the matter of "wolf packs," or loosely formed bands of investors who defy existing regulatory categories but nonetheless exert collective influence. Regulation that is sensitive to both the inadequacies of past approaches to corporate-shareholder relations and the novel challenges posed by increasing shareholder activism will be able to harness activism, allowing capital markets to flourish.

Since the 17th century, when corporations started to finance their businesses by issuing securities to investors in the open market, the appearance of misleading prospectuses and/or intermediate information to the market has led regulators to promulgate preventive and repressive rules to mitigate such abuses. This occurred both during the South Sea Bubble (1719) and the Great Crash (1929). More recently, the series of corporate scandals (2002-2003) similarly resulted in pressure on regulators and gatekeepers to introduce enhanced investor protection and market regulation, coinciding with the already ongoing worldwide debate on corporate governance. This study focuses on a comparative analysis of the remarkably different regulatory responses that were established on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The book reveals the divergent regulatory policies that were followed to answer the question of whether investors should primarily be protected 'as shareholders' by corporate law or by securities law and market regulation. It offers a useful, analytical, comparative tool for evaluating current corporate and securities law, as well as for assessing the need for, and design of, new regulatory responses. The book will contribute to a better understanding of the key regulatory issues facing lawmakers today. History does not stop and a variety of new questions will ultimately emerge. It underscores that finding clear and efficient regulatory responses to new developments should start with a proper analysis of the aims and means of securities and corporate law.