Defeat In Detail

No critical analysis has ever examined the specific reasons for the Ottoman defeat. Erickson's study fills this gap by studying the operations of the Ottoman Army from October 1912 through July 1913, and by providing a comprehensive explanation of its doctrines and planning procedures. This book is written at an operational level that details every campaign at the level of the army corps. More than 30 maps, numerous orders of battle, and actual Ottoman Army operations orders illustrate how the Turks planned and fought their battles. Of particular note is the inclusion of the only detailed history in English of the Ottoman X Corps' Sarkoy amphibious invasion. Also included are definitive appendix about Ottoman military aviation and a summary of the Turks' efforts to incorporate the lessons learned from the war into their military structure in 1914. The Ottoman Empire fought the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 against the joint forces of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—and was decisively defeated. The Ottoman Army is frequently depicted as a mob of poorly clad, faceless Turks inept in their attempts to fight a modern war. Yet by 1912, the Ottoman Army, which was constructed on the German model, was in many ways more advanced than certain European armies.

The third in Robert Greene's bestselling series is now available in a pocket sized concise edition. Following 48 Laws of Power and The Art of Seduction, here is a brilliant distillation of the strategies of war to help you wage triumphant battles everyday. Spanning world civilisations, and synthesising dozens of political, philosophical, and religious texts, The Concise 33 Strategies of War is a guide to the subtle social game of everyday life. Based on profound and timeless lessons, it is abundantly illustrated with examples of the genius and folly of everyone from Napoleon to Margaret Thatcher and Hannibal to Ulysses S. Grant, as well as diplomats, captains of industry and Samurai swordsmen.

"On War" by Carl von Clausewitz (translated by J. J. Graham). Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to everyone in a high-quality digital format.

This paper is a case study in the wartime evolution of tactical doctrine. Besides providing a summary of German Infantry tactics of the First World War, this study offers insight into the crucial role of leadership in facilitating doctrinal change during battle. It reminds us that success in war demands extensive and vigorous training calculated to insure that field commanders understand and apply sound tactical principles as guidelines for action and not as a substitute for good judgment. It points out the need for a timely effort in collecting and evaluating doctrinal lessons from battlefield experience. --Abstract.

Burma-felttogene, 1942-1945 - den engelske general William Joseph Slim, "Bill" Slim, "Uncle Bill", 1891-1970, skrev i 1956 disse krigserindringer om de berømte felttog og kampe i Burma, hvor det efterhånden lykkedes at få vendt krigslykken og få nederlagene vendt til sejre, og få overtaget fra de ellers så mægtige og uovervindelige japanske styrker i Sydøstasien, speciel Burma og Nordindien. "It is a personal narrative, written from the standpoint of a corps or army commander in the field, whose outlook was often limited by his own surrondings. It is based on a short account I wrote at the time, a skeleton diary, some contemporary papers, and my recollection."

"Admiral Sharp draws a grim and frightening picture of what happened -- and could happen again." -- Union-Leader (Manchester, NH)

Told here for the first time in vivid detail is the story of the defenders of Wake Island following their surrender to the Japanese on December 23, 1941. The highly regarded military historian Gregory Urwin spent decades researching what happened and now offers a revealing look at the U.S. Marines, sailors, soldiers, and civilian volunteers in captivity. In addition to exhaustive archival research, he interviewed dozens of POWs and even some of their Japanese captors. He also had access to diaries secretly kept by the prisoners. This information has allowed Urwin to provide a nuanced look at the Japanese guards and how the Americans survived three-and-a-half years in captivity and emerged with a much lower death rate than most other Allies captured in the Pacific. In part, Urwin says, the answer lies in the Wake Islanders’ establishment of life-saving communities that kept their dignity intact. Their mutual-help networks encouraged those who faltered under the physical and psychological torture, including what is today called water boarding. The book notes that the Japanese camp official responsible for that war crime was sentenced to life imprisonment by an American military tribunal. Most spent the war at a camp just outside Shanghai, one of the few places where Japanese authorities permitted the Red Cross to aid prisoners of war. The author also calls attention to the generosity of civilians in Shanghai, including Swiss diplomats and the American and British residents of the fabled International Settlement, who provided food and clothing to the prisoners. In addition, some of the guards proved to be less vicious than those stationed at other POW camps and occasionally went out of their way to aid the men. As the first historical work to fully explore the captivity of Wake Island’s defenders, the book offers information not found in other World War II historie

This historical study investigates why Union joint operations between army and navy forces on the Mississippi and other western rivers were effective. It examines the development of a joint doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Joint riverine warfare on the western rivers was a new experience for the U.S. military. There was no clear delineation between services of specific missions or responsibilities. Joint operations incorporated numerous battlefield operating systems that the leadership had to integrate and synchronize. At the strategic level, Washington attempted to provide adequate vessels and other resources for the war on the rivers. However, the national leadership never did institute an adequate joint command and control structure for the Western Theater. The army operational commanders came to depend on the advice of the naval officers for acquiring vessels and advice on water-borne operations. On the other hand, the naval officers relied on the infrastructure of an established army to facilitate their operations. The personalities of the joint leadership were important factors in the success of joint warfare. Grant, Sherman, and Porter developed a special relationship, which allowed them to overcome tactical disagreements, and maintain a clear focus on the strategic objective of capturing Vicksburg.