Defense Against Biological Attacks

This first volume of a two-volume set describes general aspects, such as the historical view on the topic, the role of information distribution and preparedness of health-care systems and preparedness in emergency cases. Part two describes and discusseses in detail the pathogens and toxins that are potentially used for biological attacks. As such, the book is a valuable resource for faculties engaged in molecular biology, genetic engineering, neurology, biodefense, biosafety & biosecurity, virology, and infectious disease programs, as well as professional medical research organizations.

Recent revelations about Iraqi and Soviet/Russian biological weapons programs and highly publicized events such as the deployment of anthrax and botulinum by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan have made clear the necessity for addressing the issues of biological warfare and defense. In a comprehensive analysis of this imminent threat to global security, fourteen internationally recognized authorities consider the motivations of governments and terrorist groups seeking to acquire biological weapons; managing the consequences of a biological attack; techniques for weapons development; methods for detection of pathogens and toxins; defense against biological weapons; and international efforts to counter their proliferation.

The attacks of September 11 and the release of anthrax spores revealed enormous vulnerabilities in the U.S. public-health infrastructure and suggested similar vulnerabilities in the agricultural infrastructure as well. The traditional public health response-surveillance (intelligence), prevention, detection, response, recovery, and attribution-is the paradigm for the national response not only to all forms of terrorism but also to emerging infectious diseases. Thus, investments in research on bioterrorism will have enormous potential for application in the detection, prevention, and treatment of emerging infectious diseases that also are unpredictable and against which we must be prepared. The deciphering of the human genome sequence and the complete elucidation of numerous pathogen genomes, our rapidly increasing understanding of the molecular mechanisms of pathogenesis and of immune responses, and new strategies for designing drugs and vaccines all offer unprecedented opportunities to use science to counter bioterrorist threats. But these same developments also allow science to be misused to create new agents of mass destruction. Hence the effort to confront bioterrorism must be a global one. Countering Bioterrorism makes the following recommendations: Recommendation 1: All agencies with responsibility for homeland security should work together to establish stronger and more meaningful working ties between the intelligence, S&T, and public health communities. Recommendation 2: Federal agencies should work cooperatively and in collaboration with industry to develop and evaluate rapid, sensitive, and specific early-detection technologies. Recommendation 3: Create a global network for detection and surveillance, making use of computerized methods for real-time reporting and analysis to rapidly detect new patterns of disease locally, nationally, and ultimately- internationally. The use of high-throughput methodologies that are being increasingly utilized in modern biological research should be an important component of this expanded and highly automated surveillance strategy. Recommendation 4: Use knowledge of complex biological patterns and high-throughput laboratory automation to classify and diagnose infections in patients in primary care settings. Recommendation 5: USDA should create an agency for control and prevention of plant disease. This agency should have the capabilities necessary to deal effectively with biothreats.

Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001, the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S. military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks? In American Biodefense, Frank L. Smith III addresses this puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and national security.Smith argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have caused both military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. In the armed services, influential ideas about kinetic warfare have undermined defense against biological warfare. The influence of these ideas on science and technology challenges the conventional wisdom that national security policy is driven by threats or bureaucratic interests. Given the ideas at work inside the U.S. military, Smith explains how the lessons learned from biodefense can help solve other important problems that range from radiation weapons to cyber attacks.

This publication gives a history of biological warfare (BW) from the prehistoric period through the present, with a section on the future of BW. The publication relies on works by historians who used primary sources dealing with BW. In-depth definitions of biological agents, biological weapons, and biological warfare (BW) are included, as well as an appendix of further reading on the subject. Related items: Arms & Weapons publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/arms-weapons Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT & CBRNE) publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/hazardous-materials-hazmat-cbrne

U.S. naval forces must be prepared to respond to a broad array of threats. Of increasing importance are those from chemical and biological warfare (CW and BW). To help review its current state of preparedness, the Chief of Naval Operations asked the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the U.S. Navy's defense capabilities against CW and BW threats. In particular to what extent are they being developed to enable naval forces to sense and analyze quickly the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents, deal with contamination under a broad spectrum of operational conditions, and over what period will these capabilities be realized. This report presents the results of that assessment. It provides an overview of the potential threats, and an evaluation of the Navy's operations, non-medical programs, and medical countermeasures designed to confront those threats. The report also presents a series of general and specific findings and recommendations based on these assessments.

Gives readers a detailed understanding of how specific biological weapons work and how those affected by the weapons would be treated Teaches the reader to recognize the symptoms of each biological weapon and understand the threat these weapons pose Concentrates on the weapons considered the greatest threats by the CDC such as Anthrax, Botulism, Smallpox, Ricin toxin, Ebola, Plague, and Viral encephalitis Provides a detailed understanding of how specific biological weapons work and how to recognize the symptoms of those affected by the weapons as well as how they would be treated Includes case studies, chapter review questions, and the instructor’s supplemental materials include PowerPoint presentations, a Test Bank, and suggestions for student projects Begins with a primer on microbiology, the human immune system’s response to these biological agents, and the defense agencies involved with protecting the public against these agents